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Abstract 
 
In a context framed by neo-liberalism, employers increasingly employ labour 
broker workers. Trade unions find it broadly difficult to organise these 
workers. Giwusa, a general union and Samwu an industrial union have 
relative success in organising broker workers at a manufacturing plant and 
municipality respectively. The comparative study of these cases finds that 
organisational form is not a necessary condition for success and there are 
similarities between the cases including the workplace organising focus and 
the common class and cultural experiences of labour broker workers. This 
experience linked to their material conditions of work, provides a foundation 
for their willingness to organise. Crucially, the unions’ class politics explains 
the two different organisational approaches. In the Giwusa case permanent 
shop stewards drive organisation, supported by the union and based on the 
market bargaining power of broker workers. In the Samwu case broker 
workers themselves drive organising from below and challenge both their 
marginalisation in the union and at the workplace, through the exercise of 
associational power. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Trade unions in South Africa have had limited success in organising flexible 
workers, including those falling under labour brokers. The central concern of 
this thesis is to understand factors in the trade unions that contribute to 
organising labour broker workers. I do this by examining the relative success 
of the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu) and the General 
Industries Workers Union (Giwusa) in organising workers employed through 
labour brokers in the of City of Tshwane municipality and at African 
Explosives Limited (AEL) respectively.  
 
The comparison of the Samwu and Giwusa cases allows for a greater 
understanding of the impact and importance of organisational form, worker 
agency and class politics in achieving such success. Samwu is an industrial 
union based in the workplace, whilst Giwusa is a general workers union 
specifically attempting to (re)locate into the community. This then provides for 
a consideration of the impact of organisational form on the cases.  
Furthermore the cases take account of different conditions under a public 
sector and a private sector employer as well as the different skill levels of 
workers.  
 
The organisational form of a trade union formally defines which workers 
belong or could belong to a particular union, including which workplaces and 
which workers at and across these workplaces (e.g. by occupation, industry or 
across industry), over what geography (local, regional, national, international) 
and location: workplace or community, employed or unemployed as well as 
numerous combinations of some or all of these. Worker agency refers to the 
practices and meanings that workers as social actors bring into the union and 
which they draw on to shape the union and their interaction with it. Union 
politics refers to how the union organises and represents its members both in 
relation to the rest of the working class and in relation to the capitalist class 
and the state. It is primarily about the union’s class politics including that 
which informs the union bureaucracies. 
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Why are these important questions 
The importance of addressing such questions is both practical and theoretical. 
The use of broker labours has sharply increased since 1994 (Theron, 2004). 
At the end of 2010 they represented 6.8% of total South African employment 
and were “the fastest growing segment of the South African labour market, 
with average annual growth of 9.4% between 2000 and 2010, compared to 
3.6% in non-agency temp work and an average annual decline of 1.2% in 
permanent work” (Adcorp, 2010).1 The lack of success in organising these 
workers means not only reduced protection and voice for these workers but 
the undermining of the collectivity of other workers who face the threat, real or 
implied of being replaced.  
 
Historically the South African independent black trade union movement 
played a crucial role in defending workers against employer strategies of low 
pay and limited or no benefits. It advanced initially non-existent rights under 
and beyond the racial capitalism of apartheid. The democratic practice of the 
unions provided collective voice to workers and substantially influenced 
democratic practice in other parts of society (Buhlungu, 2008). Given this 
historical role it is important to understand factors that could contribute 
towards union revitalisation including organising the unorganised. 
 
Secondly whilst there has been a substantial and growing academic literature  
from the early 1990s focused on revitalising the labour movement, particularly 
rooted in work on the United States and some work in South Africa, there are 
a number of gaps in this literature (Buhlungu, 2008; Buhlungu and Webster, 
2004; Chun, 2005; Clawson, 2003; Grossman, 2009; Kenny, 2007; Kenny, 
2004; Kenny and Webster, 1999; Lopez, 2004; Milkman, 2004; Silver, 2003; 
Tait, 2005; Theron, 2009; Von Holdt and Webster, 2008; Voss and Sherman, 
                                                
1 The importance of the figures lies in the trends. Adcorp Holdings Ltd itself is the largest labour 
broker in the country and through Capacity supplies labour to AEL. Whilst not exclusively labour 
broking the company had an estimated annual revenue of close to five billion rand in 2009 
(Mahomedy, 2009). It is very keen to defend the social importance of labour broking in an argument 
that supports the regulation of labour brokers rather than their banning (which Cosatu calls for). 
Towards this it publishes employment figures and is currently at loggerheads with Statistics South 
Africa regarding the premises on which it constructs the data (see Lehohla, 2011). Adcorp has already 
advised its shareholders that regulating labour brokers would not harm profits as regulation would 
drive smaller competitors out of the market (Adcorp, 2010). 
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2000; Webster et al, 2008). We have had institutional analyses of trade 
unions in transition and we are seeing analyses of workers’ agency in the 
processes. But we still lack a clear political analysis of trade unions organising 
and mobilising labour broker workers.  It is through this that we are able to 
grasp some of the broader contradictions of unions and to better understand 
the kind of process and struggles necessary to shift these to respond to 
workers’ needs. This thesis contributes toward that analysis.   
 
The argument 
Neo-liberalism frames the wider context under which organising takes place, 
constructing “insecurity” at home and work, in a conscious strategy to attack 
working class gains and power (see Harvey, 2003). This has given rise to 
changed social relations in the plant and society as a whole and fragmented 
previous solidarities.  
 
A broad literature on union revitalisation highlights the organising dilemmas 
that unions face and their responses to this challenge (see for example 
Buhlungu and Webster, 2004; Milkman, 2004; Von Holdt and Webster, 2008). 
Parts of the literature understand organisational form and industrial unionism 
in particular as a major obstacle in the organisation of precarious labour. 
However form cannot in itself explain why trade unions do not challenge and 
change these limits (Grossman, 2009; Theron, 2009). E.P. Thompson and his 
application help me to understand what workers themselves bring into 
organisation and how this shapes the form and meaning of such association. 
This rescue’s the agency of the working class and provides a critique to an 
overly institutional reading of trade unions.  
Organisational form 
Chapter 4 argues that whilst organisational form may be important for 
historical reasons it has not, in the Giwusa and Samwu cases, been a 
necessary condition for the successful organising of labour broker workers. 
Both unions, despite their different organisational form, one being an industrial 
union and the other a general union, have had some success in organising 
the labour broker workers.  Other factors including the strength of workplace 
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organisation, relations between labour broker and permanent workers, how 
long and how many labour broker workers are at the workplace, as well as the 
union’s political priorities play a more important role.  
Social agency 
How labour broker workers themselves impact on the challenge of organising 
is the subject of Chapter 5. Broker workers in Samwu and Giwusa, have, 
when provided with the opportunity indicated great willingness to take action 
to confront their problems. In this as well as other senses they have been an 
important force revitalising local workplace (and by implication) the wider 
union. What is it in the experience of this layer of workers that helps to explain 
the relative organising successes of these cases?  
 
It is clear that in both unions the labour broker workers are of similar 
demographics (young) and in both they had little experience with unions. In 
Samwu an older mentor played an important role whilst in Giwusa it is the 
older and permanent shop stewards who do the mentoring. Broker workers 
impact on union organisation through the understandings and social 
meanings they bring into the workplace. On the one hand there is a 
perception that trade unions belong to an historical past of struggles that no 
longer exists. On the other, some of these young and better educated workers 
bring important social experiences drawn from school, church, cultural and 
political organisation. These equip them with both technical and organisational 
skills and awareness. The experiences in both cases are very similar. 
 
This is an important factor that coupled with their material circumstances 
explains a willingness to organise. How this potential is realised is crucially 
shaped by the union’s class politics. 
Class Politics 
Despite similarities between the cases (organising broker workers with 
common class and cultural experiences at the workplace) there were two 
broadly different approaches towards organising. These are examined in 
Chapter 6. In the first organisation is “driven” and “anchored” by Giwusa shop 
stewards. They pursue a programme directed at both permanent and labour 
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broker workers. They challenge understandings that might divide workers, 
take up cases and target the primary employer. In the second labour broker 
workers drive their own organisation and formally join Samwu. Samwu 
engages in slow and often legalistic processes without the necessary power 
to bring about change. Driven to change their material conditions at the 
workplace and confront unequal treatment both at work and in the union, 
broker workers organise and act. In the process they influence the union 
branch and eventually the municipality. How do we explain these different 
approaches? 
 
Drawing on an organisational legacy of strong workplace organisation Giwusa 
shop stewards organise broker workers through strategies that build worker 
unity. Crucially this is framed politically by the union leadership who 
understand labour broker workers as one of the forces for reviving militant 
unionism. The skills of the broker workers in the strategic industry of explosive 
production, strengthens their bargaining power with AEL who employs them 
directly but on fixed term contracts. 
 
In contrast municipal labour broker workers drive their organisation from 
below. Samwu is unable to build unity between labour broker and permanent 
workers because of limited resources and weak workplace organisation. This 
failure is explained partly through a centralised industrial relations architecture 
that dominates union rhythms and displaces the importance of agendas from 
below. Bureaucratic approaches by Branch leadership in negotiations with the 
council do not rely on worker mobilisation on the ground. This may be 
because of leadership corruption and ambivalence to the employer (the ANC) 
who is also Samwu’s political ally.  
 
Persistent self organisation by labour broker workers on the ground, including 
exercising associational power through marches and strike action, challenges 
and undermines their marginalisation both inside the union and in the Council 
and wins them direct but contracted employment.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
Introduction 
Organising workers employed by labour brokers can be understood through 
several existing literatures.  The chapter begins by looking at neo-liberalism 
which has framed my understanding of the problem in its generation of 
widespread inequality and the expanded use of flexible and insecure labour. I 
use Polanyi to begin understanding how the expansion of this unregulated 
market results in society producing a counter movement. The extensive 
literature on union revitalisation and organising excluded and marginalised 
workers helps to define the organising dilemmas and challenges faced by 
unions. Within there are arguments that the organisational form of trade 
unions influences the success or otherwise of successfully organising 
excluded workers. I find these arguments too structural thus resulting in the 
exclusion of agency. E.P. Thompson and his application assist to rescue the 
agency of the working class. It is important for my argument to compliment 
this with a literature that facilitates understanding of the class politics of trade 
unions and the boundaries that workers construct between themselves so as 
to grasp the exercise of agency in the context of an existing union politics.  
Neo-liberalism, labour and insecurity 
Various political and economic factors assist to broadly explain the expansion 
of neo-liberalism.  I am framing my understanding of the expansion of 
vulnerable forms of labour through an examination of how neo-liberalism 
contributes to changing conditions of labour and how these contribute to 
shaping worker grievances. 
 
Neo-liberalism as an ideology has justified the growing deregulation of labour. 
It has resulted in increasing inequality and insecurity globally, impacting on 
the workplace, at home and across society generally. As Webster et al (2008) 
conclude, whilst insecurity has been a feature since the industrial revolution, 
“what is new is the strategy of neo-liberalism to consciously manufacture 
insecurity as a strategy to undermine the collective power of civil society 
movements” (Ibid: vii).  
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David Harvey (2005) explains the rapid spread of neo-liberalism from the late 
1970s as the programme and policies aimed at the “restoration of class 
power,” in the face of a growing crisis of capital accumulation. A crisis 
expressed through the inability to reinvest capital in profitable outlets as well 
as its face in growing unemployment (Ibid: 31). He shows shifts in the 
composition of the upper class benefiting from this, which is not the same as 
the past. He particularly points in Britain to the rising power of a new class of 
entrepreneurs and in the US to the gains for CEO’s and financiers. 
Corporations increasingly make profits through finance and not only 
production. Neo-liberalism strongly promotes private property, free markets 
and trade, whilst limiting the role of the state to achieving these aims. The 
theory calls for minimum state intervention into the market. The turn to neo-
liberalism has resulted in widespread deregulation and privatisation, as well 
as state pull-back from a range of social welfare activities. Taken as a whole 
this ideological agenda has resulted in growing inequalities (Harvey, 2005).  
 
From the early 1980s there has been pressure from capital to restructure the 
South African state and both reduce costs and increase efficiency (Macun and 
Psoulis, 2000). Inheriting the apartheid state the ANC in government post 
1994 quickly adopted the Growth, Equity and Redistribution (GEAR) policies 
of 1996, a neo-liberal macro-economic policy. GEAR policies included: 
 
· Monetary policy that focused on inflation targeting and reduced budget 
deficits. This resulted in serious constraints on budget expenditure 
including reduced transfers to local government, declining 
infrastructural investment and welfare; 
· A corresponding process of commercialisation and privatisation of state 
assets and functions, increasing the involvement of the private sector; 
· The liberalisation of capital flows both in and out of the country 
resulting in the disinvestment of six large corporations and the 
increased power of foreign as well as institutional investors able to 
ensure increasing focus on narrow short-term gains;  
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· Fiscal policy aimed primarily at lowering tax rates for corporations;  
· Developing flexible labour markets; and 
· Freer trade through tariff reductions that resulted in declining 
manufacturing capacity and increasing import penetration. 
 
A number of commentators highlight the consequent increasing inequality, 
growing unemployment and under employment, declining production capacity, 
as well as a range of cost recovery measures imposed on working class 
communities (such as pre-paid water meters) ( Marais, 2001; Bond, 2005 & 
2006; Macdonald and Ruiters, 2005; Macdonald 2008). The reregulation of 
the labour market facilitated labour broking (Theron, 2005). 
 
Municipalities with the vastly increased geographical service areas of post-
apartheid received smaller national transfers and were constrained by the 
same policies from raising tax locally. Municipalities responded through 
implementing wage restraint, lowering labour costs by employing contract and 
casual labour and the by privatising and commercialising services (Bond, 
2005, Samson, 2004). The public sector becomes an agent for shifting public 
money into the private sector for profit (Grossman, 2009). Samwu local and 
national struggles against privatisation, the Cosatu campaign against 
privatisation, as well as the Samwu national wage strikes of 2002, 2005 and 
most recently in 2009, express parts of the reaction to these. To facilitate 
substantial city wide restructuring National Treasury also made available 
once-off transfers through its Restructuring Grant. Tellingly first implemented 
to fund Johannesburg’s iGoli 2002 plan, the City of Tshwane (CoT) later 
began to receive tranches of the grant. A key condition for the grant was that 
Council labour costs should not exceed 28% of their total operating budget. A 
report by a Council official states that this constraint led to increased "reliance 
on the services of contract or casual workers who are sourced through third 
parties known as labour brokers and has acted to limit their employment as 
permanent Council labour" (CoT, 2007a).  
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In manufacturing, reduced tariffs and freer trade flows have resulted in 
heightened competition for particular sectors. At the same time long term 
planning is more difficult given institutional shareholder pressure for short 
term profit and with wide and often unpredictable fluctuations in the value of 
local currency. One response from capital has been the wider use of 
contingent and labour broker labour to increase flexibility, reduce costs and 
avoid the requirements of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) (Theron, et al, 
2004). African Explosives Limited (AEL) is part of AECI (African Explosive and 
Chemicals Industries), which was in turn historically part of the giant Anglo 
American before institutional investors forced Anglo to unbundle and 
specialise in mining (Mohammed, 2007).2 It produces explosives and 
detonators largely for the mining industry and dominates significant segments 
of the local market (Imrie, 2009). As a local supplier it is integrally tied to 
movements in the mining industry. Increasing competition particularly from 
Chinese imports of less sophisticated explosive products have led the 
company to embark on extensive downsizing and automation (Imrie, 2009, 
Jackson, 2010, Rees, 2008a). In the process there has been extensive 
retrenchment and particularly from 2000 the increasing use of labour broker 
workers (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010).  
 
Numerous scholars have examined the impact of the effects of what Karl 
Polanyi more than half a century ago called the “self-regulating market” 
(Burawoy, 2003; Silver, 2003; Munck, 2004).  Polanyi argued that the 
expanding self-regulated market leads to waste and destruction – of humans 
and of nature. The market is a mechanism to balance the supply and demand 
of commodities through the price mechanism. Commodities are defined as 
things produced in order to sell. However land, labour and money are 
according to Polanyi “fictitious” commodities. Labour, the activity of human 
beings is not produced for sale, nor is land (nature) and money is a store of 
value. He shows historically  that the expansion of the self-regulating market 
actually required state intervention and planning. Societies before the 
                                                
2 The term institutional investors refers to investors such as Alan Gray, Investec, etc who have vast 
amounts of money to invest and seek quick short-term returns, in contrast to share owners who commit 
to the fortune of a particular company and thus its short term ups and downs. 
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industrial revolution used markets, but these were embedded in society, and 
not the logic and consequences of the market subordinating society (Polanyi, 
1944). 
 
In response to the destructive impact of the unregulated and expanding 
market a counter movement develops. Polanyi calls the expansion of the 
market and the simultaneous reaction by a range of groupings in society to its 
destructions, the “double movement.” What is required is a “re-embedding” of 
the market into society. The reaction by society is however not necessarily 
progressive as Polanyi observed in the rise of fascism and the Second World 
War (Polanyi, 1944). Scholars have raised the question of how recent 
changes in the political economy have altered conditions for working classes 
and what responses might be expected (Burawoy, 2003; Silver, 2003; Munck, 
2004). They have explicitly linked Polanyi’s discussion of the self-regulating 
market to neo-liberalism. 
 
As Silver (2003) argues, in the process of its development capitalism makes 
and unmakes the working class. This process, which unmakes an established 
working class and remakes an emergent working class, operates often at the 
same time, in the same process of transforming production and social 
relations. It does so geographically and across industries – where capital goes 
there is the potential for organising. So whilst there are changes, Silver 
suggests there are also opportunities. It is also true that there are substantial 
changes in the production process, the structure of the working class and 
even the collapse of wage labour and that such structural change make 
working class unity more difficult. These same processes, however, also 
create conditions to undermine such divisions (Grossman, 2009). 
 
In summary neo-liberalism constructs “insecurity” at home and at work in a 
conscious strategy to attack working class gains and power (see Harvey, 
2003). However society reacts to the spread of the unregulated market and in 
the constant unmaking of established working classes there is often in the 
same process a remaking of the working class and out of this, specific 
possibilities for resistance. Curiously the unmaking of permanent labour in the 
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municipality and at AEL is at the same time and place the making of the new 
working class in the form of labour broker workers 
 
Silver offers really useful insights; however her emphasis on structure may be 
too causal in terms of resistance and thus undermining of a far greater role for 
agency. Similarly the Polanyian perspective does not explain how to build 
opposition, the “active society,” instead he understands it as spontaneous, 
and thus cannot accommodate issues such as resources, capacity or legacy, 
in building counter hegemony. Polanyi also does not take proper account of 
capitalist power and thus the bloody resistance emanating from such class 
interests; and at least in classical Marxism and some of its subsequent 
developments, the need to organise and build a countervailing power to deal 
with capital (Buroway, 2003; Webster et al, 2008).   
 
More specifically Webster et al (2008) highlight several points of weakness in 
the Polanyian understanding of a counter movement stressing that the biggest 
obstacle to building the movement lies in workers’ insecurities resulting from a 
turn away from agency.  
 
Polanyi raises the importance of subordinating the market to society, re-
embedding it in society; but does not explain what society is. Buroway (2003) 
understands society as a historical product which has a social structure and 
institutions which includes and excludes (spatially and socially) based on 
social characteristics and the distribution of power. Society has racial, 
gendered and class divisions.  Consequently a resulting counter movement is 
not simply solidarisitic but would also carry and need to challenge and reveal 
such tensions, conflicts and interests. 
 
Polanyi suggests that the counter movement emerges spontaneously to the 
self-regulated market without explaining who and why will there be a response 
(Munck, 2004), nor that movements have to be constructed and in particular 
there is “no understanding of how the formation of the working class is an 
active process.” There are also issues of various resources, leadership, its 
vision, issues of commitment and imagination (Webster et al, 2008:8-9).  
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Thirdly Polanyi does not locate the labour movement and there is a question 
as to how does this “old” social movement fit into and organise with the “new” 
social movements. Castells for example (quoted in Munck, 2004) suggests 
that unions are not up to the task whilst Silver (2003) points to the making and 
unmaking of the working class (as outlined above) specifically with reference 
to the role and power of Labour.  
 
However strength is not spontaneous, nor produced by capital accumulation, 
it needs “new sources of power” (Webster et al, 2008:11). And this is the 
fourth problem, Polanyi has no real conceptualisation of power (Silver, 2003, 
Munck, 2004). Wright (2000: 962) refers to the conceptual difference between 
associational power, which is: “various forms of power that result from the 
formation of collective organisation of workers (trade unions and parties)” and 
structural power which results from workers “location in the economy”.  Silver 
develops this by suggesting that market bargaining power may result from 
scarce skills or the ability to withdraw and survive in a context of low 
unemployment. She says that workplace bargaining power emanates from 
tightly integrated production processes where a stoppage in one part impacts 
more widely on the other parts. The different structural power of workers 
implies different associational strategies.  
 
The understandings that this critique raises, with its elaboration of the 
connection between neo-liberalism and labour, particularly with respect to the 
divisions of society, agency and the conscious building of organisation, are 
important to explain my argument. They are elaborated in the sections below. 
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The organisational forms of trade unions   
 
Craft, industrial and general union  
At a formal level the organisational form of a union determines who can or 
cannot become a member of the union and therefore who the trade union 
represents. So Hyman (2002) tells us, unions can organise on the basis of 
occupation, which links to their position in the labour market (craft, white-collar 
or professional for example). He says this lowers possibilities for members 
identifying with “their” bosses but represents a “narrow and elitist conception 
of interests” (Hyman, 2002:11). The industrial union organises all workers in 
an industry, broadening the scope of representation and solidarity, whilst a 
general union brings workers together across both industries and occupation 
but he says, may face problems “sustaining effective cohesion” (Ibid 11). 
Whatever the form, trade unions “unite and divide at one and the same time” 
(Ibid 11). 
 
Beverly Silver (2003; 2005) places the above in historical perspective showing 
a trend across time and space for auto production (1930s US, 50s and 60s 
Europe and in the 70s the semi-peripheral locations of Brazil, South Africa 
and S. Korea) that the expansion of mass production undermines craft 
workers and their unions. The creation of a new semi-skilled working class 
results in new forms of organisation (industrial unions) and becomes part of 
an upsurge, based on direct action given their strategic location in production. 
In the process “new independent unions were formed and the residue of old 
organisational structures were swept aside (or forced to transform themselves 
in response to the mass upsurge from below)” (Silver, 2005:445).  
 
In South Africa, with similar structural logic reducing the form of organisation 
causally to the production process, Webster (1985) tells us that from the 
1970s, “Changes in the labour process led to a shift in the balance of power: 
the decline of the ‘labour aristocrat’ saw the rise of the production worker. As 
a consequence a new form of workplace organisation emerged – the 
industrial union, which through the strategic location of its members in the 
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labour process was able to challenge the traditional forms of control in the 
foundry” (Webster, 1985:261). But this “new form,” was also a choice, given 
that other choices included the preceding craft or perhaps more saliently a 
choice as against building a general union. The rise of manufacturing and 
semi-skilled workers provides the basis for industrial unionism but does not 
explain the choice for this form of organisation rather than the general union. 
Both Silver and Webster leave little room for agency. 
 
In the debate on union revitalisation in the United States a number of authors 
point to the organisational form and history of trade unions to explain both 
obstacles and generators of revitalisation (Lopez, 2004; Clawson 2003; Voss 
and Sherman 2000). Milkman’s (2006) work seeks to understand union 
revitalisation in Los Angeles amongst immigrant workers who are highly 
fragmented between workplaces and face constant employer threats to 
outsource or replace them. She argues that one of the explanations for 
successful organisation relates to the specific histories, organisational form 
and methods of the AFL trade unions despite their being characterised as less 
progressive than the CIO. She shows that the AFL unions developed in a pre-
mass production era and learned techniques to organise craft and 
occupational categories across workplaces, “taking the wages out of 
production.” This situation anticipates the aggressive “post-industrial” 
restructuring implemented by employers from the late 1970s. Furthermore the 
unions had learned to win employer recognition without reliance on the law – 
something elaborated further under the politics section (below). In contrast the 
CIO as a mass based industrial union is unable to respond effectively to the 
new challenges. Its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s was based on 
expanding mass manufacturing, New Deal politics committing to economic 
regulation and reduced inequality; and the 1935 National Labour Relations 
Act (NLRA) which legally recognised the right of workers to organise and 
“helped propel union density to its peak level in the mid-1950s” (Milkman, 
2006:5).  More broadly unions continue to give-up their hard won gains in a 
downward process of concession bargaining (Albo, 2009). Milkman’s point is 
that organisational form impacted on union organisation capacity and 
imaginations.  
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Poor workers unions  
Tait (2005), also writing on US labour, argues that trade union organisational 
form and base in the workplace hinders revitalisation, constructing exclusivity.  
She lists a number of external forces that act to undermine trade union power: 
capital mobility; declining manufacturing employment and a rise in contingent 
employment; an increasing number of workers in the labour market and an 
increased ability of employers to resist unionisation in the workplace together 
with unfriendly labour legislation in the U.S. But, such challenges have 
occurred in the past and she therefore seeks an explanation for the decline 
and failure to organise the unorganised in the internal reaction of unions. Here 
she lists four reasons. One of these is that organising “craft by craft and 
industry by industry” necessarily constrains the broadening of membership 
and that the division between workplace and community is not only artificial 
but assumes falsely that the best site for working class struggle is in the 
workplace (Ibid:7). Three other reasons forwarded are the culture of business 
unionism; unionists that would not believe in the possibility of organising 
contingent workers, women, immigrants or the poor; and their racial, ethnic, 
gendered and immigrant prejudices. Examining an experience of what she 
calls “poor workers unions” she argues that these unions organised initially in 
the community around issues ranging from rent to welfare, but then 
broadened logically into the workplace. Whilst acknowledging that these 
unions are small she asserts that their biggest contribution, some having 
sustained themselves over periods of a number of decades, is their potential 
to influence established unions to change their conceptions of organising 
(Ibid:2).  
 
Tait includes in her exploration of new forms of organisation: community, 
workers centres and welfare-based unions. She asserts that contrary to 
Michels’ iron law of oligarchy, which posits that there is a tendency towards 
oligarchic leadership and conservatism3 (see e.g., Voss and Sherman, 2000, 
for a discussion), that poor workers unions have found the basis to both 
                                                
3 Michels studied largely the European socialist parties. He found a growing distance between full-
timers and the membership and that in preserving their own survival in the organization they articulated 
conservative interests (Voss and Sherman, 2000).  
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institutionalise and sustain mobilisation based on the rank and file, although 
perhaps in contradiction to the law, given their small scale (Tait, 2005). 
 
In attempting to explain why the independent black trade unions have not 
organised “peripheral workers” some argue that in South Africa the industrial 
union cannot deal with the fragmented workplace of outsourcing, labour 
broking and casualisation under neo-liberalism, rooting part of the explanation 
in form (Ilrig, 2009). Others conclude for example that whilst South Africa’s 
industrial base is relatively strong, the increasing size of service and informal 
sector “demand new forms of organisation by labour” (Buhlungu and Webster, 
2004: 243). Or that alternatively, where contingent workers are at the same 
workplace or that the work process is integrated that existing unions can 
organise the casualised, but would need to “adopt innovative and provocative 
organising strategies” (Van Holdt and Webster, 2008:342). However what is 
not explained is why then, the union fails to actually initiate these.  
 
Furthermore some writers assume that because a trade union is not 
organising the periphery, let alone the unemployed, that they adequately or 
“only” serve the needs/interests of their membership (Ilrig, 2009; Tait, 2005) 
and that membership and organisation in the core industrial workplace 
“remains relatively robust” (Van Holdt and Webster, 2008: 334). Without some 
kind of change it is suggested that this would continue, for example: unless 
there is a return to social movement unionism and a turn to organise the 
unorganised and link with communities, trade unions “will remain confined to 
core workplaces and core workers” (Von Holdt, 2003:307). Such assumptions 
also emanate from parts of the social movement, such as the APF (Grossman 
and Ngwane, forthcoming).   
 
However these claims are not borne out in the reality of declining membership 
and downward concession bargaining. Treating categories of “core” and “non-
core” labour as fixed, without exploring their relationship and impact on each 
other as well as the impact of socio-economic crisis is not only ahistorical but 
selective.  How do we understand “relatively robust” organisation when the 
permanent auto worker of yesterday is either retrenched today or unable to 
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defend the contingent worker who is. Business unionism went on a cycle 
downwards desperately but unable to defend the gains of the (declining, 
increasingly unconfident) “stable core” (Lopez, 2004; Grossman, 2009; see 
also Kenny and Webster, 1999). The neo-liberal onslaught entered the 
boardroom, top and middle managerial layers, as well as administration and 
the factory floor (Crotty et al, 1998).   
 
Furthermore focusing uncritically on constructs such as declining 
manufacturing and increasing services may result in us missing the point that 
just as the permanent becomes the unemployed so parts of manufacturing 
“become” services. A number of authors show that a significant part of service 
growth lies precisely in such externalisation, in South Africa for example there 
has been significant growth in “business services,” under which fall security, 
contract cleaning etc. (Roberts and Mohamed, 2006; Theron 2004). For 
Theron (2009) it is precisely the interconnections with the major employer that 
require revealing. Any discussion on form has to go further and acknowledge 
that characterisations of certain forms are themselves not static and may 
change over time and place.  
 
Whilst the Cosatu of the 1980s was a federation of national industrial trade 
unions, the Cosatu shop steward local incorporated student, unemployed etc 
representatives, and its industrial union base far from exclusive generated 
what Silver in another context calls hegemonic and non-exclusionary 
demands and issues that became and were extended to other workers (Silver 
2003). Labels such as industrial or general unions, do not explain what 
stopped an industrial union expanding its scope (defining industry for example 
to include the excluded and subcontracted cleaner in the chemical factory) or 
the probability that the general union may have to structure internally along 
industrial lines (Grossman, 2009; Theron, 2009). Nor if we look at history does 
it show unevenness of power and participation within the union between say 
small and big factories or more and less prominent geographical locations 
(urban vs. rural) and thus the possibility of a hierarchy of layers, inclusions 
and exclusions right inside the union and amongst the “included.” But 
externalisation changes the meaning of who is the employer and thus the 
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workplace under the Labour Relations Act. The workplace previously 
comprising auto workers united with cleaning workers under one industrial 
union is now, under the formal logic of industrial unionism, divided into two 
unions: a car workers union and a cleaning workers union. This of course is a 
problem for worker unity but to solve it we have to also ask what then 
stopped/prevented the struggle for a wider unity in the workplace? (Kenny, 
2004; Grossman, 2009).  
 
Further issues of form would have to contextualise how unions link and co-
ordinate with each other, as well as with social movements. Co-ordination 
between unions is important for building wider solidarity (Hyman 2004:11).  
What then stops trade unions of any form building co-ordination and unity in 
struggles in or across workplaces? Historically and particularly during the 
1980s in South Africa there was a far greater spirit and practice of solidarity 
within and across trade unions (Buhlungu, 2010). Today unions are more 
likely to be competing for membership even if they are part of the same 
federation.  
 
Organisational form also refers to characterising unions in terms of an 
assumed set of attributes or as a set of models. So most pertinently, some 
unions in the US are defined as business unions characterised as organising 
from the top based on a servicing rather than an organising model and rooted 
in narrow bread and butter issues. This is compared to social movement 
unionism with the attributes of rank and file organising, collective action going 
beyond the strike, alliances with community organisations and framing 
demands beyond the labour market (Lopez, 2004; Barchiesi and Kenny, 
2008). Barchiesi and Kenny however critique the notion of social movement 
unionism as applied to South Africa, arguing that it is not so much a model but 
rather a set of contingent factors which resulted in workers responding to their 
immediate vulnerabilities. As such the concept conceals rather than offers 
explanation and a way forward.  
 
Strong arguments for social movement unionism include a call for the fusion  
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of trade unions and social movements in an argument for preparation of the 
next great upsurge of labour (Clawson, 2003). Such arguments locate in a 
wider debate regarding the extent that working class organisation at the point 
of production (exploitation) is able to provide leadership, unity and hegemony 
in relation to society as a whole, what Silver calls Marxist type struggles as 
against one that favours broad coalitions and unity against the market and 
commodification (Polanyian struggles) (Buroway, 2003).  
 
Organisational form constructs boundaries to formal membership, but cannot 
in itself explain why these boundaries are not challenged and changed or 
alliances built to overcome such limitations. Beyond the boundaries of 
membership there are other kinds of boundaries between workers.  
 
Discussion on boundaries  
Silver’s (2003) discussion on boundary drawing is useful. At a general level 
she speaks of a struggle not only over the content of working class rights but 
also who actually accesses these rights. Whilst capitalism is able to provide 
rights to some workers, systemically it cannot accommodate all workers 
(presumably this is more acute in semi-peripheral SA with one of the highest 
gini co-efficients in the world). Exclusions therefore follow and are expressed 
through “boundary-drawing strategies,” that take three broad forms: 
segmented labour markets (driven by capital), citizenship (largely initiated by 
states) and “class identities on non class bases” (which workers themselves 
pursue) (ibid: 24). 
 
Drawing on Arrighi (1990) she argues that “Marx was incorrect to infer that 
just because capitalists treat workers as interchangeable, workers themselves 
would willingly relinquish non class bases of identity. Indeed, precisely 
because the ongoing unmaking and remaking of the working classes creates 
dislocations and competitive pressures on workers, there is also an endemic 
tendency for workers to draw non class borders” (Silver,2003:22). In other 
words as Arrighi (2009) states: “the only thing that matters for capital is the 
possibility of exploitation…(but when) workers are subjected to this disposition 
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of capital…they mobilize whatever status difference they can identify or 
construct to win privileged treatment from the capitalists. They will mobilize 
along gender lines, national lines, ethnicity or whatever, to obtain a privileged 
treatment from capital (ibid: 17).” “Exclusionary boundary drawing” by the 
state and capital for their benefit may turn “difference” amongst workers into a 
tension ridden divide as occurred between South Africa migrant and resident 
urban workers (Mamdani,1996 in Silver, 2003:24).  
 
This then alerts us to how the ruling classes or parts of the working class 
might use and drive “differences” between permanent and non-permanent 
workers for their own “interests”. More specifically Kenny (2007) roots 
divisions between contingent and  permanent workers in retail in relation to  
the meaning attributed to “worker,” thus moving beyond institutional 
explanations to understand why trade unions have not made progress in 
organising contingent labour. “The legacy of trade unionism in the 1980s 
embedded a broad rhetoric of workplace rights in post-apartheid South Africa, 
but it also reproduced the ideal subject of these rights as the full time, 
permanent worker…Institutional strategies, and organising legacies, then, are 
built on pre-existing traditions of “worker” identity, reinforced in law, through 
control, as well as trade union actions. Under democracy, the right to worker 
inclusion narrowed to the direct employment relation and the sphere of the 
workplace , and rights become based on an ideal category that no longer 
characterised experiences within retailing” (ibid:487). Kenny’s work pushes us 
to take agency seriously. 
 
Some of the processes through which workers shape and construct 
boundaries may be part of the wider agency of the working classes in their 
own making. Such acts of agency do not only construct boundaries but in 
particular circumstances not all of their own making, blunt, breach or destroy 
them. 
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The working class as social actors 
A number of authors suggest the importance of understanding what workers 
themselves bring into organisation and how this shapes the form and meaning 
of such association. This literature provides a critique to an overly institutional 
reading of trade unions.  
 
Writing on the historical development of the English working class, EP 
Thompson (1963) shows the working class as actual social actors, active in 
their own making as a class, in a process that “owes as much to agency as to 
conditioning.” Rather than being passive victims, it is their conscious efforts 
that contribute to the making of history (Thompson, 1963:9). Sitas (1995) in 
his research on migrant metal workers on the East Rand shows how networks 
were built around migrant “cultural formations.” In a context of exclusion from 
both “meaningful participation” in urban life and in the factories, these 
facilitated the spread of unionisation and the wider sharing of this experience 
amongst migrant workers on the East Rand. As their conditions (in the hostels 
and at the factories) “forced men to seek and find Fosatu union offices,” they 
brought into the process of mobilisation their understandings and meanings. 
“Lineage, language, values and expressions that were deemed to be “ethnic” 
were used as threads to weave the solidarity of a social movement unionism” 
(Ibid:12). However just as importantly such solidarities built as blacks and 
workers were undermined later. Politically defined urban issues took priority 
over migrant rural, homestead matters and excluded pressing concerns in 
urban areas of worsening hostel living conditions. In the factories the unskilled 
migrants were displaced and the attacks resulting from the early 1980s 
recession led to disillusionment in the ability of unions to defend against 
retrenchments. The migrant leadership of the emerging unions further shifted 
over the 1980s to a new more skilled worker leadership based in the 
expanding sectors (Sitas,1995). 
 
Buhlungu (2008) tells us that workers shape what they build and that 
organisational forms and intellectual influences do not just take shape in a 
vacuum. In building the emergent trade unions he says that workers brought 
with them experiences from organisations and cultures including student, 
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youth and church associations that “predisposed them to a democratic union 
culture.” These experiences “imbued” its solidarity and identity (ibid: 97).  
 
In understanding the rank and file Milkman (2006) explains that the 
constituency of immigrants in Los Angeles, United States, had a stronger 
collective culture than native white Americans and thus really responded to 
unionisation. At the same time they did not fear dismissal or deportation. In 
contrast to the myths that they were “sojourners”, accepted lower standards 
and feared deportation, she argues that three reasons actually made them 
easier to organise. These were social networks, their lived experience which 
was more collective, and their shared experience of prejudice (ibid: 133). This 
is important, as existing unions and their structures may prejudge the 
possibility to organise labour broker workers constructing similar “myths” 
regarding vulnerability and fear of dismissal. Where workers come from and 
what they bring matters and as the story of migrants on the East Rand tell us, 
this is not cast in stone for all time, what workers bring and how they even see 
where they come from, changes over time.  
 
Little of the literature on union revitalisation in South Africa goes beyond 
issues of institutional change, so as to draw fully on worker experience to 
explain limited organising successes. Lopez (2004) in a case study of 
organising health workers in Pittsburgh, US, shows the importance of 
overcoming the legacy of (business) unionism. Here workers viewed unions 
negatively as responsible for deindustrialisation and corruption.  Successfully 
organising workers was more than the application of social movement tactics, 
but also entailed constructing a “new vision of participatory, powerful 
unionism” to overcome this legacy (Lopez, 2004:17). Kenny (2007) takes this 
forward in study of retail workers in South Africa. She shows that union legacy 
itself is underpinned by the notion of what it means to be a worker. In the 
context studied, retail contingent workers define themselves as excluded from 
a notion of worker. This notion is a full time permanent worker (reinforced by 
law that provides a hierarchy of rights based on the full time permanent).  
Contingent worker demands for “inclusion” are for inclusion into the “narrow 
notion” of worker as employee. The very process demanding inclusion at the 
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point of production thus accentuates “divisions of labour” and notions of 
“them” and “us.” Using Buroway (2003) she suggests the importance of 
including demands beyond the point of production: against commodification 
(free schooling and public transport) and for “inclusion” at the point of 
production that covers all workers, such as a living wage and a 40 hour week 
(Kenny, 2007: 481).  
 
Whilst undoubtedly useful and contributes to understand workers’ 
representation of hierarchy amongst themselves, alone it is not sufficient to 
explain institutional strategies, organising legacies or legislation that 
reinforces such identity. To do this requires an understanding of unions as 
contradictory organisations, with a tendency towards bureaucracy, as they 
practice under capitalism. Worker experience is crucial to understanding 
unions’ responses’ to the challenge of organising labour broker workers, as 
well as to what broker workers bring into the union. However without 
distracting from what workers themselves bring, it is also about what they are 
“allowed” to bring into the organisation. Joining and shaping emerging unions 
has to be different from joining and shaping the same unions 20 or 30 years 
later, after they have “emerged.” I seek to understand processes that shape 
this, through an understanding of the unions’ class politics.  
 
Union class politics 
It is important to include an analysis of union politics in our understanding of 
organising precarious workers. This allows us to grasp some of the broader 
contradictions of unions and through this to better understand what kind of 
process and struggles might shift these to respond to workers’ needs.  
 
Bureaucracy 
Voss and Sherman (2000) examine an experience of union revitalisation in 
the United States and conclude that the “iron law of oligarchy” is not inevitable 
in “old” social movements, therefore holding the possibility for breaking the 
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link between conservatism and bureaucracy (Voss and Sherman, 2000:330).4 
They identify three factors that combine to make this possible. There was an 
internal union crisis that results from declining membership or employer 
attacks and as a consequence a new leadership is either elected or imposed 
from the top. This leadership comes from outside the union movement 
bringing a different experience drawn from social movements that includes 
different organising methods, confrontational tactics and vision. They are not 
used to the service model and “saw organising people as the way to build 
union power.” Lastly the process was backed by the respective union head 
office. This explanation sees leadership and their politics (from outside and 
within) as decisive. Milkman (2004) emphasising the importance of the AFL 
occupational experience highlighted above, shows that in a number of 
struggles success came where there is both a rank and file mobilisation and 
support (resources, strategy) from the top.  
 
In searching for an understanding to explain the poor response of South 
African unions to the challenges of organising contingent workers one part of 
a tentative conclusion is that “complacency induced by institutionalisation 
prevents the unions from a more than rhetorical commitment to innovation” 
(Van Holdt and Webster, 2008:351).  But the authors do not substantially 
explore either the bureaucratic underpinnings of “institutionalisation” or the 
politics of incorporation and demobilisation that might explain such. An earlier 
piece by Buhlungu and Webster (2004) characterised the heart of the US 
union revitalisation debate as the shift from business unionism to social 
movement unionism. They add that South Africa and indeed the South as a 
whole, needs “far more than simply trying to strengthen existing 
organisations,” requiring “imaginative ways of engagement” with capital, parts 
of the working class and the state (Buhlungu and Webster, 2004:230). In so 
doing they uncritically elaborate a number of the very problems that might 
constrain revitalisation and worker struggle, including declining worker control, 
legalism, bureaucracy and acceptance of achieving worker goals through 
notions of common interests between workers and capital.  
                                                
4 See footnote 2 above 
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Legalism 
Amongst the methods that both Milkman (2004) and Voss and Sherman 
(2000) refer to as crucial to revitalisation in the US, is building the organised 
strength of workers on the ground instead of relying on US labour law that 
increasingly favoured employers. Chun (2005) in a comparative study of 
janitors struggles in the US and Korea shows how despite a lack of legal 
rights, workers successfully organised and built the associational power of 
their unions through alliances and mobilisation resulting in a transforming of 
workers from “invisibility” to public “recognition” (Chun, 2005:498). Key to this 
process was “symbolic leverage” which constructed the worker disputes 
beyond narrow contractualism into the moral and political sphere of “justice” 
(Ibid: 498).  
 
But legalism is just as relevant to South Africa both as legacy and current 
practice. Through the recognition agreement capital, confronted by the 
expanding union organisation of emergent unions in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, constructed their terms for accepting and providing worker rights to 
trade unions (Theron, 2009). What much of the South African literature above 
misses is that the labour law introduced in the early eighties following the 
Wiehahn reforms, was precisely designed to reduce workers support through 
workplace organisation and their own activity (Theron, 2009:7).  
 
Legalism of today 
In the literature corporatism and the class compromise of the industrial 
relations framework, Nedlac and the LRA are uncritically seen as gains rather 
than contributions to worker demobilisation (Webster and Buhlungu, 2004; 
Buhlungu, 2010). In respect of labour brokers for example, the LRA explicitly 
provides for the Temporary Employment Service as employer, thus protecting 
the de facto employer, allowing for the undermining of standards and 
increased vulnerability of broker workers. It also provides for the individual 
contract which provides the space for employers to circumvent labour law; 
and the definition of a workplace, designed to protect large national unions but 
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making it difficult precisely to win organising rights against labour brokers 
(Theron, 2009; Theron and Godfrey 2000). Against a union call to ban labour 
brokers Theron says there is “no regulatory quick fix,” and that unions “need 
to open up new spaces in the workplace as it has been reconstituted” if they 
want to carry on the emergent union tradition (Theron, 2009: 17).  
 
Declining worker control 
In explaining the decline of the culture of worker control in the black 
independent trade unions Buhlungu (2008) draws on a number of factors. He 
explains its birth as necessary, local and workplace based, supported by full-
timers, but later undermined by the introduction of community and national 
political issues. However how national politics or community issues undermine 
workers control is not explained, and so there is no assessment of the politics 
and the community issues in particular or of the possibilities for alternative 
outcomes.  Swilling for example in examining the early shop steward councils 
shows that workers wanted to engage in community issues precisely to assert 
their dominance over bourgeois interests in the community (Swilling, 1984 in 
Barchiesi and Kenny, 2008). Further pressures undermining democratic union 
culture according to Buhlungu come from both employers and the ANC whose 
more centralised and unmandated style results in quick decisions at the top. 
These pressures are strengthened through the economic changes resulting 
from globalisation. These together undermine internal democracy. At the 
same time class formation leads amongst other things to the “fracturing of 
activist-organiser fusion.” The process of democratic transition in 1994 further 
demobilises the union, negatively impacting on democracy (Buhlungu, 
2008:102). Significantly Buhlungu points to the ascendancy of administrative 
modernisation and bureaucratic control which strengthens the power of full-
timers against the control of workers but avoids characterising the class 
politics of such a bureaucracy. Nor does he unpack the class politics 
dominant either in the unions or the ANC, focusing merely on its 
centralisation, and how these themselves may contribute to worker 
demobilisation. 
 
 27
Theron (2009) highlights the impossibility for substantial worker control if 
finances are controlled at union head offices by a full time staff. Buhlungu 
does not explore the process that union leaders played in demobilising 
workers including building their hope in bourgeois parliament and processes 
such as Nedlac over which they have little or no control over outcome. His 
explanation remains remarkably structural without pointing to features that 
were a result of political choice, somewhat ironical given his correct and 
earlier emphasis on worker experience. Other factors that Von Holdt 
highlights is a decompression of the working class with skilled workers moving 
upwards at the workplace or into government, greater individualism and the 
dismantling of shop stewards who previously united in their representation of 
workers, though he cautions and shows a messy and often violent historical 
democratic practice (Von Holdt, 2003).  
 
In the shift that facilitates a revitalisation of unions in the US is also a shift in 
the attitude of top AFL-CIO leadership from that of business unions seeking 
partnerships with corporate capital against international competition, to 
confronting capital as the prime “architects” of neo-liberalism, including 
shifting resources away from funding the Democratic Party to organising 
workers on the ground (Lopez, 2004:7).  This shift from partnership to 
confrontation with capital is given further expression by Grossman (2009). In 
writing of outsourced workers at UCT, he says that in building protection and 
looking for gains, the outsourced workers confront the pillars of the dominant 
politics of trade unions. These he characterises as: 
 
National bargaining structures that were built historically for maximum unity 
and to spread gains to the weak but which now strengthen bureaucracy, and 
where minimums become maximums and then actual wages; allowing 
employers to justify “starvation wages and intolerable conditions”;  
Protective legislation which whilst inadequate never the less make the 
compliant employer look both legitimate and moral; 
Limited law of strikes where workers are unable to strike legally against the 
main employer; and 
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Industrial unionism which instead of building unity, ends up dividing workers 
between separate unions (Grossman, 2009: 4).  
 
He argues that the major problem underpinning these and the “routinism and 
proceduralism,” based on agreements and the law, are “particular forms of the 
old politics of class collaboration,” defined as a way of expressing the politics 
of workers through the “shared interests between employers and workers, 
reflected in a shared commitment to profitability, competitiveness, attracting 
capital investment, and routines of ‘industrial peace’” (Grossman, 2009:4). 
 
In conclusion 
Institutional analyses of trade unions are unable to explain why an industrial 
trade union confronted by restructuring and fragmentation in the workplace is 
unable to change its scope and build worker unity. Part of broadening 
understanding towards an explanation entails properly incorporating workers’ 
agency; and we are seeing analyses of workers’ agency in the processes. But 
we still lack a clear political analysis of trade unions organising and mobilising 
labour broker workers. This thesis contributes toward that analysis.   
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Chapter 3: Method   
The chapter begins with an outline of why I studied Samwu and Giwusa in the 
research. This is followed by an explanation of the different research methods 
used and their limitations. Finally the chapter concludes with a section on the 
ethics of the research.  
 
I chose two different unions to explore the research into organising labour 
broker workers. These are the South African Municipal Workers Union 
(Samwu), the largest national industrial union in the South African municipal 
sector and the General Industries Workers Union of South Africa (Giwusa). 
Giwusa is a general workers union which is currently opening its membership 
and decision making to the unemployed and has recently located some its key 
local structures in the community. The unions were chosen for several 
reasons. Both unions have had some “success” in organising workers 
employed by labour brokers into their union and in achieving workers’ 
demands for direct employment by the prime employer and they have 
different organisational forms. As such they offer useful cases to explore the 
basis for such success and how their differing organisational form, traditions 
and organisational and political practices impacted on the process. 
  
The comparison of the Samwu and Giwusa cases provides “a frame of 
reference within which to make sense of the research findings” (de 
Vaus,2001:40). De Vaus highlights that in the case study method comparison 
follows the “exhaustive analysis of individual cases” where “contextual 
information is collected about a case so that we have a context within which to 
understand causal processes… if similar results are found for particular cases 
in the study, then we develop greater confidence in the findings of the cases” 
(ibid: 50-51). Buroway argues that “The extended case method derives 
generalizations by constituting the social situation as anomalous with regard 
to some pre-existing theory (that is, an existing body of generalizations), 
which is then reconstructed” (1991:280). Thus the comparison is based on 
pre-existing theory which suggests that it is important to compare two cases 
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of different organisational form.  It is out of this comparison that I am able to 
reconstruct the theory to show that form is not everything.   
 
A comparison of the Samwu and Giwusa successes thus allows for a greater 
understanding of the impact and importance of organisational form, traditions 
and organisational and political practices on the process and may bring to 
light other factors. Samwu is an industrial union based in the workplace, whilst 
Giwusa is a general workers union specifically attempting to (re)locate into the 
community – thus presenting successes derived from different organisational 
forms.  Furthermore the examples take account of different conditions under a 
public sector and a private sector employer, including differences in worker 
skill levels.  
 
The particular areas of “success” referred to above and focused on in the 
study was the organisation of labour broker workers in the municipality of 
Tshwane (which is the product of the integration of the Pretoria, Centurian 
and other municipalities) into Samwu; and in the case of Giwusa the 
organisation of labour broker workers at the Modderfontein plant of African 
Explosives Limited (AEL). 
 
In doing the research I made use of four methods. Firstly documentary 
research in order to access any relevant union resolutions, policy or 
discussions with respect to organising labour broker workers or related 
categories of workers. This has included union newspapers, briefings, 
memoranda, minutes of meetings as well as legal opinions and congress 
resolutions. It has also but to a far more limited extent, given the focus of the 
research, entailed drawing on City of Tshwane Council resolutions, labour 
broker contract tender awards and individual contracts. Given that both the 
union material and the Council material were supplied by union officials there 
may be some selectivity and thus cannot be considered as fully 
comprehensive. Furthermore in some areas, general meetings for example, 
there is not a systematic written record or these were not easily accessible. 
However given triangulation through interviews as explained below this is not 
considered to be a problem. Further contextual and historical information was 
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gathered through the web, including the Samwu web site and an internet 
search particularly for press coverage of strikes and marches and AEL, 
Adcorp and Capacity company information.  
 
Secondly key informant interviews were held with two union officials from 
Giwusa and three from Samwu in order to provide historical and contextual 
information regarding the unions’ attention towards organising labour broker 
workers and as a basis for possible snowballing. These were face to face or 
telephone interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire.  As I am 
engaged in a comparison it is useful to have some standardization in the 
broad questions. At the same time I needed to allow flexibility for further 
questioning and clarity and to understand “the full story and not simply 
answers to standardized questions” (Wiess,1994: 3). I only used telephone 
interviews when I ran out of time but they were essential in the absence of 
anything else. I knew or had met all the people that I interviewed over the 
phone. The interviews included: 
 
John Appolis interview 1: 4.8.2010 (Newtown); GIWUSA General Secretary 
from 2003-2010 
John Appolis interview 2: 6.12.2010 (Kensington) At the time of this interview 
he had stepped down as General Secretary  
John Appolis interview 3: 25.1.2011 (by telephone) 
Noko Nkgoeng: 31.8.2010 (Germiston); Giwusa Branch organiser servicing 
AEL. 
Zebelon Monkoe 8.12.2010, current Samwu Tshwane Branch Secretary and 
former branch Chairperson (By telephone). 
Roger Ronnie 8.12.2010, former Samwu General Secretary (By telephone) 
John Mawbey 11.1.2011 Samwu Education and Training Officer (focused on 
Samwu’s history as he has researched and written an unpublished book) 
 
I also drew on three previous interviews that I conducted at the end of 2007 
and the beginning of 2008 in research for a Naledi paper on labour brokers 
(Rees, 2008b), as follows:   
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Mike Mthembu 24.1.08, Samwu Tshwane Branch Secretary at the time. He 
was joined towards the end of the interview by Zebelon Monkoe who was then 
the Branch Chairperson. Mthembu was part of the Pretoria Municipal Workers 
Union (PMWU) that merged with Samwu in 1988. 
Interview with labour broker shop stewards from Milnex, Quatrokor and ZF (6) 
16/1/2008  
Interview with labour broker shop stewards from Milnex, Quatrokor and ZF (6) 
25/1/2008  
 
Focus Groups 
Focus groups served as a core source of information for gathering information 
on labour broker workers’ experience and understanding of unionism, 
processes that shaped them towards joining the union and the impact of the 
unions’ politics and form. Macun and Posel (1998:115) suggest that there is a 
broad consensus that “focus groups are typically defined as bringing together 
a small group of people to participate  in a carefully planned discussion on a 
defined topic, the aim of the technique  being to make use of group interaction 
to produce data and insights.” The method has the advantage of changing the 
balance of power between the facilitator who poses the questions and guides 
the discussion, drawing on a more collective experience from the participants, 
which may also result of course in compliance to a group dynamic or 
disagreement. In the use of focus groups many speak of it as providing 
“voice” to the marginalized (Morgan, 2006:133). Moderation is crucial and 
more or less structure (number of questions) depends on the goal of the 
research as does the issue of either encouraging participation or leaving 
participants, recording this and following it up afterwards. However smaller 
groups allow each participant more time to present their views and for better 
control/direction from the moderator (Ibid). 
 
Summarising the strengths of the technique Macun and Posel say that it: 
· Is efficient, allowing a number of interviews over a short time period; 
· Allows for the exploration of new areas; 
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· “May deepen and shape the participant’s self-understandings, heightening 
their awareness of, and insight into, those aspects of their experience under 
discussion.” (Ibid:122) 
· Reduces the unequal relationship of interviewee to interviewer that occurs 
through an individual encounter and may result in “moulding responses.” And 
whilst “broad power relationships” are not done away with, they are 
“minimized”. Power moves to participants who create “meaning in interaction 
with each other about their social experiences” allowing a “sense of solidarity” 
(Ibid:123). 
 
There is acceptance that “each group interaction will be unique” and that the 
group may “shape or further create” individual responses (Ibid:125). However 
using (Mishler, 1986), Macun and Posel say that this problem actually 
confronts all research methods. They then suggest that reliability “is best 
tackled through triangulation” (Ibid: 129). This means using different research 
methods to generate “complimentary” data on the same question (ibid: 129).  
 
 The focus groups comprised of three groups of five labour broker shop 
stewards (or former shop stewards) each, two groups from Samwu and one 
from Giwusa and one group of two permanent shop stewards from Giwusa (a 
total of 17 shop stewards). I facilitated the focus groups. To overcome 
potential language problems I was accompanied by a translator, Arthur 
Lekalake. As it turned out all focus groups took place in English (participants 
were encouraged to speak the language of their choice but chose English). 
Choosing English may simply reflect power relations and undoubtedly would 
have weakened the richness of their contributions. However considerations of 
time, resources and my own enthusiasm to directly “hear” responses acted to 
close the other option. 
 
In order to set the tone and facilitate collective focus in each of the first focus 
groups held with the broker stewards, participants were asked to draw a river 
reflecting the ups (sun/smile) and downs (snake/frown) of working for a labour 
broker and their organisational experience. They did this in groups of 2 or 3 
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and then presented this. Visualisation of this kind is a useful way of 
encouraging participation, presenting and understanding experience (Keith, 
1999).  
 
The respective unions organised the stewards with the request that they 
should be directly familiar with the history and current challenges associated 
with organising labour broker workers, with at least some of them having been 
employed under the labour broker, themselves. In the case of Samwu the first 
focus group consisted of shop stewards from the labour brokers contracted to 
do waste removal and servicing the inner city of Tshwane (reflecting the large 
Pretoria West depot and a number of smaller ones). Their workplaces and 
organisation under Milnex, the broker responsible for waste in 2007, were 
central in a range of militant action, including the three week strike in 2007.  
The second of the Samwu focus groups consisted of shop stewards from the 
labour brokers contracted to do work in parks, (there was no particular 
specification regarding their depots but in reality they came from a depot in 
Soshanguve and from Moregloed in Queenswood) and had worked 
historically for the labour brokers ZF and Quatrokor. Both waste and parks fall 
under the Department of Housing, City Planning and Environment. These 
sections used high levels of labour broker labour from the companies of 
Milnex, ZF labour contractor closed corporation as well as Quatrokor. All the 
Samwu participants are now directly employed by the council on either a fixed 
or open ended contract (permanently).  
 
The Giwusa labour broker focus group was made up of five shop stewards. 
Four were previously labour broker workers but are now employed on contract 
by AEL directly, a company manufacturing explosives in Modderfontein. One 
of the participants remains an employee of the labour broker Capacity.  They 
are all familiar with the challenge and process of organising. The focus group 
of permanent AEL shop stewards, anticipated to comprise six shop stewards 
only consisted of two, never the less went ahead.  
 
Shop stewards rather than ordinary members were chosen as participants 
because they would have been a militant part of the successful organising 
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process, access to shop stewards is easier than to ordinary workers and as 
key actors in the process were likely to have greater knowledge of the union 
and its politics. 
 
The transcribed data collected from the focus groups was subject to a process 
of coding in an attempt to thematically organise and then analyse it. The 
results from the key informant interviews and the document analysis were 
also incorporated. 
 
The focus groups met on the following dates:  
Giwusa labour broker shop stewards 9.9.2010 (3 hours, Germiston Giwusa 
offices) 
Giwusa labour broker shop stewards 23.9.2010 (2.5 hours, Germiston Giwusa 
offices) 
Samwu waste labour broker shop stewards 30.8.2010 interview (2 hours, 
Tshwane Samwu offices) 
Samwu parks labour broker shop stewards 17.9.2010 (2 hours, Tshwane 
Samwu offices) 
Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010 (3 hours, Germiston Giwusa offices) 
 
I was given a tour around the AEL Modderfontein work site, by two permanent 
shop stewards, but this did not entail entering buildings. I had also during 
2007 been shown around the City of Tshwane. This provided useful 
background history both on production and organisation. On certain specific 
questions I made a telephone follow-up to another Giwusa permanent shop 
steward. 
 
AEL factory visit 1.9.2010 
Giwusa Permanent interview 22.1.2010 over the phone 
 
Life Stories 
In order to understand in greater detail what experience workers bring with 
them and the social forces that have shaped this, I conducted five face-to-face 
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interviews with the labour broker stewards exploring their life stories. This was 
done after the focus groups were complete ensuring their greater 
understanding of the research and an aspect of triangulation. The additional 
contact with the shop stewards concerned aimed to secure greater confidence 
and a fuller story (Weiss, 1995). These were qualitative interviews allowing 
the participant to tell their story and the interviewee to pursue different lines of 
clarity depending on that story (ibid). As in the overall study I sought results 
based less on “counting and correlating and more on interpretation, summary 
and integration… supported more by quotations and case descriptions than 
by tables or statistical measures” (Ibid:3) It entailed asking the respondents to 
relate their life stories and to highlight social experiences they thought 
contributed towards them eventually joining the union. As such it was also 
about clarifying their organisational and political experience, as well as their 
work experience. An interview of about 3 hours was conducted with each of 
the labour broker shop stewards except for one of the Samwu shop stewards 
who I interviewed twice. Two of the interviews were with Giwusa and three 
with Samwu shop stewards respectively. One of the Giwusa shop stewards 
was a man and the other a woman, thus reflecting some gender balance 
(something neglected in the study due partly but absolutely not entirely to the 
predominant male leadership). In addition the male was chosen because he 
was still working for Capacity (the labour broker) whilst the women previously 
employed by Capacity was now directly employed by AEL on a fixed term 
contract.  The three Samwu shop stewards are all now working directly for the 
municipality, two worked for brokers as waste workers and the other in Parks. 
The interviews are captured in the table below. 
 
Table 1:  Schedule of life story interviews 
 
Union  Name Date  Place Duration 
Giwusa Mandla 6.10.2010   Germiston 
Giwusa offices 
3 hours 
Giwusa  Mpo 10.11.2010 Germiston 
Giwusa offices 
2.5 hours 
Samwu Bethwell 5.10.2010 Tshwane Samwu 
office 
3.5 hours 
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Samwu Welile 23.10.2010 Tshwane 2.5 hours 
Samwu Welile 30.10.2010 Tshwane 2.5 hours 
Samwu Xolani 5.11.2010 Tshwane Samwu 
office 
3 hours 
 
The pursuit of the detailed life stores proved fruitful. However full justice in this 
area would require not only speaking to more respondents but also doing so 
in even greater depth. Time and logistical constraints would not allow this. 
Limits of methods and problems emerging 
Due to work pressures as well as union commitments some stewards only 
attended one focus group. In two cases it was a woman who was unable to 
return. This diluted the gendered perspective of women which was already 
under represented in the study given that both focus groups and interview 
respondents were predominantly male. The postponement of the AEL 
permanent shop steward focus group on several occasions restricts the wider 
opinion and experience of the other permanent shop stewards.  
 
As referred to under the section on focus groups above, all interaction with 
participants was in English and this would restrict local metaphor and 
expression. Further constructs result to the extent that participants construct 
their responses to associate with my “white” middle class background. This 
however needs to be balanced with what I suggest below are advantages that 
result from my union background.  
 
I am not aware of any limitations to the research that derived from my position 
as a former trade unionist (in Samwu and Ppwawu respectively) and as an 
employee at the time, at Naledi, Cosatu’s research unit.  In fact the knowledge 
and connections built during my work as a unionist have strengthened the 
research by providing insights, enhancing access to participants and 
contributing towards trade unions approving and supporting the research. This 
has also assisted to make participant interactions more confident and trusting.  
However like any other interview-respondent situation, a participant may 
make associations as a result of my background and then feel that he or she 
should develop answers accordingly. 
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In general time and resource constraints, including speaking to shop stewards 
and not to workers directly, limits the voice of workers on the ground as well 
as the nuance and expression that might derive from that. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Participant informed consent was obtained after I explained the research and 
its ethics to those invited to participate. They were informed that involvement 
in the research was voluntary, and that refusal to participate would not result 
in any negative consequences; that the research would assist the author to 
complete his Master’s Degree at the University of Witwatersrand and could 
provide information and findings that participants, their union and the union 
movement would find useful. Participants then provided their written consent.  
 
I explained that participation in the research should not be risky and whilst it is 
not possible to maintain confidentiality given both union involvement in 
facilitating the research and the focus groups, anonymity could be maintained. 
This was done by recording views and opinions using a coding system for 
participants. I assured participants that should any consequences arise due to 
their participation in the research that I would offer whatever assistance I 
could at the time. 
 
Written permission was sought from both trade unions regarding the research. 
They both indicated their willingness to support the study and to facilitate 
access to potential participants. I undertook to make the research results 
available to each union and to brief them, if required. 
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Chapter 4: Organisational form 
Introduction 
In the chapter I firstly outline arguments in the literature that emphasise the 
importance of organisational form in organisational renewal and in organising 
labour brokers. I then assess these arguments in relation to the evidence 
collected from the Giwusa and Samwu cases. Lastly I draw conclusions as to 
how organisational form has impacted on their organisational strategies.  
 
Arguments around organisational form 
Organisational form structures the “demarcation of unions’ membership 
constituency” into occupational, industrial or general unions (Hyman, 
2002:11). Industrial and general unions are not “discrete forms” given that the 
general union can organise industrially and the industrial union broaden its 
coverage so as to make “the pursuit of an industrial strategy impractical” 
(Theron, 2009:7).  Labour broker workers are temporary workers and move 
between different jobs at different companies but pertinently in this argument 
move across different industries. As such, an industrial union would not be 
able to maintain its membership and thus organisation outside its “industry.” 
To organise successfully requires new organisational forms able to operate 
across these sectors (John Appolis, 4.8.2010; Ilrig 2009). 
 
Milkman (2004) argues that the craft union (the AFL) born under conditions 
with high levels of flexibility that approximate current workplace restructuring, 
rather than the industrial union, has the necessary resources, tactics and 
historical repertoires to organise across occupations and skills in different 
workplaces.  
 
From another angle, labour broker workers’ insecurity and fear of losing work 
requires space away from the workplace so as to organise outside of the eyes 
of employers, where they feel freer. In addition labour broker workers, 
because of unemployment between jobs, have features closer to the classical 
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unemployed, than to a worker with a job. For these two reasons the 
community becomes a stronger base to organise from than the workplace. 
Issues these workers confront centrally entail community type demands for 
housing, affordable services etc. (John Appolis, 4.8.2010). Furthermore it is 
not the case that the workplace is the best place to organise as it is more 
exclusive than the community, (Tait, 2005). 
 
Applying the arguments to the evidence 
Organisational form establishes the basis on which a worker can or can’t 
belong to the union. This then reflects more specifically in for example the 
union’s constitutional scope. However, whether the workers covered under 
the scope actually belong to the union, is a matter of organising. Thus in both 
cases the organisational form of the union, Samwu as an industrial union and 
Giwusa as a general union, does not in and of itself preclude the organisation 
of labour brokers. The formal constraint for Samwu as an industrial union is 
that it is limited to organising workers (broker or otherwise) who carry out the 
work of a municipality (independent of whether they are employed by the 
public or private sector). Giwusa on the other hand, as a general union does 
not face such restriction and is able to pursue the organisation of workers 
(broker or otherwise) across industrial demarcations. However the point here 
is that nothing in the Samwu and Giwusa scope precluded either union from 
organising labour broker workers at AEL or at the Tshwane Municipality.  
 
Historically the nature of the employer in municipalities was local government. 
As such Samwu was largely a one employer union. The impact of neo-liberal 
restructuring has introduced changes to both ownership and the workplace, 
including privatisation and commercialisation. Some parts of Samwu 
(including shop stewards and organisers in Tshwane) understood that Samwu 
only organised workers directly employed by municipalities and that 
organising private sector workers would provide Samwu support for 
privatisation, a policy that was strongly opposed (my personal interaction in 
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Samwu).5 This may have influenced the weak response to initiating the 
organisation of broker workers but cannot be explained as a result of 
organisational form.  More particularly this did not prevent the recruitment in 
2001/2 of labour broker workers in Tshwane when they came to the branch 
office wanting to join. The organiser quickly found clarity from head office that 
it was in fact Samwu policy to organise such workers (Samwu waste broker 
shop stewards 30.8.2010; Xolani life story, 5.11.2010)6. Furthermore where 
existing union scope (including bargaining scope) suggested excluding the 
possibility of organising or covering such private sector workers by the 
bargain, Samwu as an industrial union has made the effort to change this. It 
has however been very unsuccessful in achieving this with the South African 
Local Government Bargaining Council (Salga) in part because of employer 
resistance (this is discussed in chapter 6). The former General Secretary of 
the union indicates that many of these changes were initiated and adopted 
without any opposition or debate from within the union (Roger Ronnie, 
8.12.2010). Thus the “industry” of municipality, previously and largely defined 
as public sector which through the application of neo-liberal policy shifts to 
include private sector participation, is redefined. The fact that Samwu is an 
industrial union does not in and of itself either prevent the actual organisation 
of labour broker workers or prevent the initiation of policy changes that would 
legitimise or formalise such a possibility.   
 
This is strong support for Grossman (2009) and Theron (2009). They both 
make the point that what we need to explain is why an “industrial” union 
confronted with such changes does not organise, change or redefine their 
industrial scope to cover such excluded workers; rather than to conclude that 
it is their organisational form that explains the exclusion (Grossman, 2009; 
Theron, 2009).  
 
                                                
5 There is a similar understanding within parts of Cosatu that organising labour broker workers would 
mean accepting labour broking itself. 
6 Another but later example concerns truck drivers employed by Capacity and working in Tshwane. 
The then branch secretary thought that they were covered by the Transport Bargaining Council and 
should be organized by Satawu (Rees, 2008b). These workers are now being organised by Samwu. 
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It may be true that labour broker worker workers move across industries, from 
retail to manufacturing (John Appolis, 4.8.2010) or within manufacturing (one 
of the interviewed AEL shop stewards), but the evidence from both the 
Giwusa and Samwu cases indicated that once at AEL or the Tshwane 
municipality, there was substantial workplace (and therefore “industry”) 
stability of labour supply from brokers. Of the shop stewards interviewed in 
the municipality, waste stewards had been employed for 12-13 years often 
after they had finished school; whilst the parks stewards had been employed 
for 5-8 years.  A report on labour brokers produced by an official in the 
Tshwane Council stated that many of the broker workers across the 
municipality as a whole had been employed for more than 5 years (CoT, 
2007a). In the case of AEL, the stewards had worked for 4 years or longer. As 
a union commentary noted, “workers of Capacity Outsourcing are placed 
permanently at AEL” (Giwusa, 2008:2, my emphasis).  
 
In the Giwusa case this stability may be explained by the skill level of the 
workers and AEL’s interest in its sustained application. The semi-skilled 
machine operators at AEL, as well as the higher skill applications like quality 
control, may thus lend themselves to a certain amount of “industrial” stability. 
In addition the very networks linked to being placed in such positions at AEL 
would also promote a stability of “industrial” labour supply, in this case 
Capacity and its established offices on the premises. Ironically labour brokers 
have a material interest in sustaining such stability and uninterrupted supply in 
so far as this provides the profits they make from such supply.  
 
Stability of supply in the Samwu case is harder to explain in terms of skill 
given that many of the workers would have had lower levels of skill. However 
the point is that there was stability and workers were employed to work in the 
municipality over lengthy periods. What changed was the name of the labour 
broker who supplied them (see Table 5 on page 81).  
 
The above is not an argument against the logic towards general rather than 
industrial unions or that there is not movement across industries. Rather the 
evidence from the Giwusa and Samwu cases suggests that there was no 
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added advantage that Giwusa, the general union held over Samwu the 
industrial union as a consequence of an organisational form that theoretically 
provides labour broker workers continued membership of the union even if 
they move to another industry.  
 
Giwusa has generated an experience of organising labour brokers. This 
includes Capacity in particular, at workplaces such as the Star and the AEL 
(John Appolis, 6.12.2010). Whilst the form provides for this, this has entailed 
choices around organisational priorities that are not determined by form itself. 
Thus Giwusa has also resolved to strategically focus on certain industrial 
sectors, as well as layers of workers, including broker workers, recognising 
their existing power in certain industries (John Appolis, 4.8.2010; Giwusa, 
2010). 
 
The integration of interests of a particular union constituency is also about 
size and geography. Samwu is a national industrial union with a membership 
of about a 100 000 predominantly permanent workers, employed directly by 
municipalities. Giwusa at just under 4 000 members, is a much smaller union, 
also of largely permanent workers located across several provinces.  
 
Sites of organising 
One difficulty in organising labour broker workers lies in their fear of dismissal 
or more leniently but as disruptive for organisation, their transfer by the broker 
to another worksite (John Appolis, 4.8.2010; Theron, 2004). Dismissal of 
workers by the client (e.g. AEL) does not necessarily mean dismissal or more 
appropriately removal from the books of the labour broker. The labour broker 
earns money through the supply of labour and thus has an interest in the 
continued supply of such labour even at another workplace (Theron, 2004).  
 
Dismissal and possible unemployment between contracts has led Giwusa to 
set up residential based shop steward councils. These, they anticipate, would 
allow broker workers to raise community demands and strengthen their 
struggle through links with social movements (Appolis, Giwusa 2010). 
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However examination of the actual Giwusa organising experience at AEL 
suggests that the primary place/site where union shop stewards organised the 
Capacity workers was at the AEL workplace and not in the community. Shop 
stewards, informed in advance by management that so many workers from 
Capacity were to be employed within a certain department, approached the 
workers encouraging them to join Giwusa (Giwusa Permanent interview 
22.1.2010). Alternatively, attracted by union notices on public boards, broker 
workers themselves attended, watched and listened to union general 
meetings resolving in some cases that the issues being discussed affected 
them as well (Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010).  
 
“It’s true that organising… starts in the factory because… of advertising your 
availability… as an organization... If you… put a notice on the notice board… 
(for a) meeting in Tembisa, it does advertise your availability but not to an 
extent that one can be convinced that I must go there. So in essence it starts 
in the plant… It starts with a shop steward… who should be able to see new 
people… coming in(to) the work area… Maybe we arrange for a mass 
meeting in Tembisa and you go there and you find a handful of members… 
Organising in the company is more effective than… in the community… The 
community… was supposed to be more fruitful… (The company has) 
regulations in place, you can’t do this, you can’t do this” (Giwusa broker shop 
stewards 23.9.2010).  
 
Discussions with permanent AEL shop stewards confirm that there was a long 
process of organising at the workplace. Despite the fear of dismissal, action at 
the workplace such as winning cases and publicising the small victories that 
resulted, as well as education that highlighted common worker problems 
created by management, became an important basis for recruitment and 
organising (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010; John Appolis, 4.8.2010).  
The process highlights the importance of sufficiently strong workplace 
organisation amongst permanent workers, as the foundation from which to 
organise labour broker workers, as a necessary, but not sufficient condition to 
explain the Giwusa case.  
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Giwusa’s focus towards broker workers is based on its strategic assessment 
that such layers are militant and have the potential to renew and reinvigorate 
existing layers (John Appolis, 4.8.2010). Such a political understanding leads 
the union to pay attention, provide resources and focus on organising them. 
Its organisational form and experimentation derives from these 
understandings. It is the strategic understandings and mobilisation of 
institutional resources towards achieving this that contribute to the successful 
organisation of brokers. These points are however more substantially 
elaborated in later chapters. This however weakens Milkman’s (2004) point 
that organisational form alone (or mainly) impacts on union organisation 
capacity and imaginations or at least its generalisation. 
 
The Samwu experience in Tshwane is similar in so far as the major space for 
organisation focused around the workplace and not the community. However 
in contrast to the Giwusa experience the organisation of labour broker 
workers was largely unsupported by permanent workers, reflecting in part 
their weaker workplace organisation. Faced by seemingly more severe threats 
of dismissal, Samwu labour broker workers also had to approach organising 
differently. Workers organised “underground” from the beginning to avoid 
dismissal. As leaders, “when we formulated any plan, our strategic point was 
somewhere on streets. We could meet in a Paul Kruger or in a park, 
everywhere, just to say, ‘Guys what do we do now? What is a way forward?’ 
And that’s where we start” (Bethwell life story, 5.10.2010). Broker workers 
were either not issued with overalls or as occurred later, issued overalls of a 
different colour in order to distinguish them. Permanent municipal workers 
were however issued with several overalls and might sell one to a broker 
worker. Wearing these, the worker activists disguised themselves, moving 
from site to site addressing groups of workers, “that thing was a disguise. 
When walking there… they thought you were from the City Council…That 
disguise helped me a lot… because I used to disguise… and go and address 
masses” (Welile life story, 23.10.2010).  Even as confidence grew however, 
some workers would continue to avoid attending lunchtime meetings in case 
management saw them there. This also resulted in organising over Saturdays 
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when management was absent (ibid) and in one case there was reference to 
holding meetings on trains on the way to work (Xolani life story, 5.11.2010). 
 
Samwu broker workers often explained that it was better to meet separately 
from permanent workers and their shop stewards for fear of being reported to 
management or because they felt that their issues were not accommodated 
by permanent workers (Bethwell life story, 5.10.2010; Samwu parks broker 
shop stewards 17.9.2010). Tension was especially bad at waste, “We used to 
leave these permanent employees. They used to insult us, ‘You Mother 
fuckers,’ and all those kind of things. They used to insult us with very big 
insults… and it’s painful, those insults are painful, insulting your mother, not 
knowing your mother, it’s painful. We said no it’s fine we’ll get them. Now 
because of (that) the anger… was growing” (Welile life story, 23.10.2010).  
 
In the methods of organising there are similarities with the historical 
experience of building both the independent black industrial and general 
unions of the 1970s and 80s. Organising meant doing this quietly, without 
employer knowledge, until there was sufficient numbers and strength to 
present the union to the employer, whether the site for this was at home or 
work. In this case quietly might mean organising behind the backs of 
permanent Samwu workers, who they mistrusted.  There is nothing in the 
organisational form of the union that prevented the organisation of labour 
broker workers. However permanent workers and union organisers did not 
initiate this, instead in some cases there was outright antagonism and 
difference towards the broker workers.    
 
In both the Giwusa and Samwu cases the workplace rather than the 
community seems to remain the major site for building and sustaining worker 
organisation. Workers find ways to do this, despite real dangers and fear, out 
of the sight and hearing of their bosses. However there is a very significant 
difference regarding the role of permanent workers or more particularly the 
role of shop stewards (workplace leadership). In the case of Giwusa through 
strong workplace organisation, permanent shop stewards are active and 
driving the organisation of labour broker workers, despite caution from their 
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own membership, whom they engage. Under Samwu the permanent shop 
steward plays a very limited role in organisation and worse is openly 
antagonistic to it. 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst organisational form may be important for historical reasons this chapter 
has argued that it has not, in the Giwusa and Samwu cases, been a 
necessary condition for the successful organising of labour broker workers. In 
this comparison we have two different organisational forms — the general and 
the industrial union — and both unions managed to successfully organise 
labour broker workers.  The evidence indicates that other factors, including 
the strength of workplace organisation, relations between labour broker and 
permanent workers, how long and how many labour broker workers are at the 
workplace (stability, turnover) as well as the political priorities of the union, 
play a more important role. It is also critical to examine how labour broker 
workers themselves, through their experience, impact on the challenge of 
organising. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Worker Agency  
Introduction 
In both the Samwu and Giwusa cases, unionised broker workers were, if 
provided opportunity and organisational circumstance, more willing to take 
action around their problems than the older union members. In this as well as 
other senses they have been a force to revitalise local workplace (and by 
implication) wider union organisation, claiming attention for their issues inside 
the unions. Workers’ experience refers to the practices and meanings that 
workers as social actors bring with them into the union; it includes their 
political histories, cultural as well as aged, gendered and ethnic interpretations 
and symbols (Thompson 1963). What is it in the experience of these broker 
workers that helps to explain both their willingness to act and the relative 
organising successes of these cases?  
 
The chapter indicates that two social characteristics stand out as differences 
between the broker and permanent workers: their age and education levels. 
Together these may if combined with other factors, provide initial explanation. 
These differences need to be understood together with workers’ wider 
ideological understanding of organisation, their role in it, and their notion of 
rights and equality. It also needs to be understood that some of these 
features, as illustrated below, may not in themselves lead to collective 
organisation at all.  
 
Generation 
Both the Giwusa and Samwu cases indicated similar generational differences 
between the permanent and labour broker workers. A greater understanding 
of these contributes to our understanding of how these dynamics impact on 
building organisation.  
 
Young workers 
Many of the broker workers came straight from school to the workplace. 
Despite the initial and limited understanding of unions, young broker workers 
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who turn to organisation brought a burning militancy that challenged old 
practices. 
 
“AEL has a tendency of employing young people and most of them you find 
are not exposed (previously) to the working environment” (Giwusa broker 
shop stewards 9.9.2010). A similar situation existed under the municipality. As 
one former Tshwane labour broker worker indicated, he joined the labour 
broker “fresh from school” (Samwu waste broker shop stewards 30.8.2010).  
 
In order to recruit workers to the union, workers need to have some 
understanding of what a union is. Many coming fresh from school have 
particular ideological constructs of unions that need to be challenged or that 
unravel in the course of their workplace experience.  
 
One opinion suggests that even if “they might have the political knowledge, 
like organisations in community and the stuff, but when it comes to labour 
movement, how they work… how they represent the workers, most of them 
they are not clear.” And: “most of the people when you talk labour movement 
they think strike… I’m just new. I’m just fresh from school, and it’s my first 
time… and then now you are telling me about joining the labour movement. 
Then now I will have to strike …which means that there will be no money. 
That’s what we normally see” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010).  
 
This may be reinforced by the caution of older workers some of whom relate 
how they had not been able to succeed using strike action or that strikes 
mean a loss of money. “They will tell you: 'okay, Mfowethu (my brother), we 
are… here for a long…This company have never won any strike here, so we 
can’t afford to go there. We are staying here, we work'. So it’s like we depend 
on them… and in some ways sometimes they are afraid of doing things 
because of their backgrounds” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010). 
Samwu shop stewards relate a very similar experience, “They used to tell us 
‘we had many strikes here but we were beaten. Hey, we are been here two, 
three months without eating,’ (laughs) it’s what they will tell you. They can’t tell 
you about what they have achieved. They will tell you about how they have 
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suffered during the strikes. And in municipality, ‘you can’t do anything. 
Municipality is municipality. You are still young, you can’t do anything,’ it’s the 
way that we were told, you see. They were not encouraging but discouraging. 
‘We have tried several times but, ahi, it’s too difficult, can’t do it.’ But now we 
(the young broker workers) said we will do”7 (Xolani life story, 5.11.2010, my 
emphasis).  
 
These ideological constructs carry greater weight when young workers still 
feel grateful for their job, whether they have come “fresh from school” or from 
unemployment and the process of continued and unsuccessful job 
applications. This understanding connects with the initial euphoria of earning 
independent money even if it is only committed to past debts including the taxi 
fare that took them to work in the first place (Giwusa broker shop stewards 
9.9.2010).  
 
“For the first few weeks you work, you get paid and that’s where the 
excitement … comes … You were at a stage whereby you were not having 
anything. So now you are able to get maybe 200 at the end of the week. That 
has never happened in the past so it looks like there is a change in your life 
now. So now you get excited” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010).  
 
“You are getting some little money into your pocket; you can do whatever you 
want to. But the conditions of work, at this time you don’t care about them, 
anyway, because you were just introduced. You are just happy. You just sign 
when they say this is the job for you ... You just sign because you want the 
job… the labour broker just give you the forms and you just sign and sign and 
sign. You don’t even care about what are they saying there (on the contract). 
Then you work for some few months” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 
9.9.2010).  But as a Samwu shop steward said “You know when you find a job 
in the first place you are happy to be working…And then we…started to see 
                                                
7 What remains unexplored, partly because of the focus of this research, is what this means to the older 
workers. This is not simple conservatism, it seems to be articulating real, prolonged and tough struggle 
(which was then the basis for future gain and social development for later generations). It is as if there 
is no context for their experience, so that it might also be interpreted not only as an obstacle to current 
struggles but as lessons from the past, in a particular context, and more than anything, something to be 
respected and acknowledged – they were after all youth and in the vanguard once.  
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that the things are not the way we wanted it to be” (Samwu 17.9.2010 
interview).  
 
Both Giwusa and Samwu stewards suggest that experiencing sustained 
unemployment makes workers “thankful” to the labour broker or to the 
municipal supervisor for placing them in employment. This is both testimony 
of high levels of unemployment and of capital’s ideological success in 
constructing themselves as part of the solution rather than the cause of the 
problem (Grossman and Ngwane, forthcoming). “When I was staying in KZN, 
it’s not that I didn’t apply for the jobs…but you don’t get employed... So the 
longer you stay without working… contributes…. When you get to Capacity 
and they say…with… (your) qualification we can give you the job, you say: 
‘Oh God at last I have got a job’… You feel that someone is now appreciating 
what you have and then you feel that you must also be thankful” (Giwusa 
broker shop stewards, 23.9.2010). Despite the low wages and terrible 
conditions that the broker workers faced, “others… still lik(ed) that guy 
because he was the one who hired them.” Affirming capital’s ideological 
success is the comment that “to us it was like life is normal” (Samwu waste 
broker shop stewards 30.8.2010).  
 
Emerging particularly from the Giwusa evidence was the view that unions are 
seen as “something of ancient times, because… they associate (them) with 
strikes and liberation from the past. So they consider themselves to be ahead 
of those times now and they can do things on their own, until unfortunately 
they happen to meet problems … which will take them back to the very same 
unions” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010).  
 
Coupled with this is a further association built by the media, that strikes are 
generally violent affairs. “What’s been created on the minds of the media is if 
you are on strike you are already fighting, strike is on the outside of the law. 
It’s illegal from the beginning. Once you start to talk about strike to someone 
who doesn’t know anything… it means that… you can go to jail. People that 
vandalized before were taken to jail” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 
23.9.2010). Again the way the notions about unions are conveyed are witness 
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to how successfully capital has “immunised” itself in post-apartheid South 
Africa and successfully separated itself from racial capitalism (Grossman and 
Ngwane forthcoming). 
 
In both cases, labour broker workers were often younger workers who were at 
least initially grateful for their jobs, lacked direct experience of unions and may 
have had negative perceptions about unions.  
 
However these understandings of unions and expressions of subservience 
are not static. A range of evidence illustrates how the younger broker workers 
are prepared to challenge practices in the workplace and have greater 
militancy linked to lower levels of family responsibility. In this sense “the great 
influx of young employees made a big difference… Remember they don’t 
think twice to do things. They don’t have kids, they don’t have high 
responsibilities… An old person when you are approaching him, before he 
thinks anything, he thinks about the family” (Welile life story, 23.10.2010). 
They are also willing to cross previously constructed social obstacles (such as 
daring to question management about a reduced wage payment) (Xolani life 
story, 5.11.2010). These link to the historical power of management and their 
knowledge of rights (one worker was prevented from taking leave and just 
took it, the subsequent case was won in his favour) as well as youthful 
confidence - this is my right. Youth were not prepared to bow their head to 
management in a “ja boss” style (Xolani life story, 5.11.2010) or accept 
working under “unbearable conditions” that older workers are “used to” 
(Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010).  
 
Shifting from the presumption that unions are no longer needed seems to rest 
on a number of factors. Firstly workers’ socially constructed needs (such as 
wage levels) are not met or they confront management’s power (like a 
disciplinary case) and cannot solve the problem by themselves. This 
understanding excludes framing the “solution” as finding another job in future 
including studying to make this possible. Secondly, depending on the 
workplace that they are sufficiently reassured that the union has enough 
power to protect them against dismissal that might result from the act of 
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joining the union. Thirdly and perhaps largely unexplored, that the way they 
chose to express themselves inside the union will be respected and heard, 
rather than simply tolerated or worse, ignored. 
 
The shift to unions is encouraged by those youth who carry a more 
progressive understanding of trade unions, some linked to particular moments 
of community and political involvement. A few have knowledge of unions and 
their struggles through their parents or relatives, “my father was a Sacwu 
member, I am working with the same company,” (Giwusa broker shop 
stewards 23.9.2010). My mother “used to tell me… ‘We are striking today’… 
So I took note of that. Oh at the workplace they also strike. She used to… like 
the way they sing … (on) strike, that is why I believe in singing. Even at the 
depot in the meeting I just start a song… and sing about Samwu, just three 
minutes, then I talk.” Some brought with them union knowledge/experience 
garnered from previous employment, “When I first come to the company I was 
so fortunate because I had been involved in the union before. I was in 
Nehawu for three years… What makes me join the union when I came to AEL 
was I was with Nehawu” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010); and under 
the municipality: “Some worked for mines others were securities… that is why 
it was so easy to explain (the union) to them” (Samwu waste broker shop 
stewards 30.8.2010). 
 
Although there was not extensive elaboration, one person suggested that he 
came from a rural area and was active in the ANC Youth League; the ANC 
leadership in the area were all teachers who belonged to Sadtu. This remains 
unexplored; a significant number of those interviewed grew up in rural areas. 
What impact does this layer of rural intellectuals have on young people’s 
understanding of unionism? Related to this, many of the stewards interviewed 
for the life stories would say that they were not involved politically because 
they had not done history at school. Involvement in school politics was 
associated with studying history.  
 
In both the Giwusa and Samwu cases there were broker workers who were 
younger and lacked an understanding of unions but there were others who 
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brought in an understanding of unions drawn from their family or from 
previous employment. 
 
Older Mentors 
The broker workers carrying these ideas and experiences were largely youth. 
The role of one worker who carried influence in his depot indicated the 
presence of older “organic intellectuals” and the importance of mentoring. He 
was an “old guy (who) loved young people. He was maybe about 52. He 
explained all about the union because he said he worked at Transnet 
company and then he was involved in the union, Numsa or NUM, I can’t 
remember. So he explained the background about the union, he explained … 
that the union can help… So we got motivated… We were calling him 
Madala… meaning old man” (Bethwell life story, 5.10.2010). More than 
encouragement to join the union Madala encouraged them to gather 
information, link and organise other depots, “’find out… how is the situation, 
are they enough, are they tired of this labour broking?’ So we went there. 
Another thing, this guy… knew about the ANC… He told us about the ANC in 
1976, I remember, he explained some of those things… In order to win some 
of these battles we need to risk, it is obvious… After coming back… from 
these depots he asked, ‘Guys how are the results, how are the responses of 
other guys?’ So we told him… so and so depot they are scared, they are 
partly scared…. So that’s how he played a role this old man” (ibid). 
 
Crucially he convinced the younger workers to overcome their fear of 
dismissal, “He used to tell these other guys, don’t be scared you are not going 
to be fired. I know about the union, I used to work at Transnet… So he 
unveiled something to these people… and (they) started to see that the union 
can help” (Ibid).  
 
In Giwusa it is the older and permanent shop stewards who mentored the 
younger workers. This has been strengthened and formalised through union 
policy such as the resolve that there should be one shop steward committee 
in the workplace that combines labour broker and permanent shop stewards.  
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In both cases there are strong contrasts in how they experienced the older 
permanent members of the union. Permanents were often seen as 
disparaging about the possibility that broker workers would be able to change 
their circumstances.  
 
Concluding generation 
It is clear that in both unions the labour broker workers are of similar 
demographics (young) and in both they had little experience with unions. In 
SAMWU an older mentor played an important role whilst in Giwusa it is the 
older and permanent shop stewards who mentor the younger broker shop 
stewards.  Furthermore there are some amongst the youth who have both 
organisational skills and understanding  that they learnt elsewhere. This is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Education  
In both cases broker workers have generally higher education levels than 
permanent workers, and  draw strongly from an organisational experience at 
school. 
 
Level of education 
In the Tshwane municipality “due to the problems that people were facing in 
their own backgrounds and … the high rate of unemployment, the greatest 
influx of young labour broker employees were … matriculated”. Some also 
came from the technicons (Welile life story, 23.10.2010). Capacity only 
recruited workers for AEL who had matric in maths and science (Giwusa, 
2010). From the evidence several issues emerge from this.  
 
On the one hand given these qualifications there is an ideological belief that 
this should have resulted in a better job, “You were expecting (to) be gaining 
experience on the technical field that you were doing. But now you are on the 
production side …daily … on production, mixing, doing all the stuff ... Then 
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now the problem starts” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 9.9.2010). This 
certainly reflects the dominant ideology endorsing a mental/manual division 
and hierarchy of reward. More generally it is linked to a wider presumption 
partly based on reality that the more educated you are, the better your 
employment opportunities will be. This is often reproduced through the family 
with the encouragement and sacrifice of frequently women headed 
households (mother/grandmother). This may in part fuel “arrogance” and 
expectancy which may collectivise and drive through union programmes 
fuelling demands for higher wages, conditions etc. But if unchallenged can 
consolidate current or future difference and differentiation.  
 
But for some, engaging in labour broker work is seen as temporary; and if the 
work is temporary why place effort into changing things collectively. It may 
produce the view that “I have a road out”, a road defined ideologically through 
individual rather than collective effort. As one shop steward commented, 
“Wena, you are having this mentality to say: ‘I will be out of here in two 
years’… They strike; you are not there, because your goal is to work this two 
years” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 23.9.2010).  Thus some continue to 
study and avoid the union and await that next step in their life. “They say they 
don’t care… we went to strike they were working. They were busy with this 
Unisa thing, they are still here” (ibid). Despite this a number of the life 
histories indicated that commonly any study post-matric was cut short through 
poverty and debt. The extent that there is realisation that there are no 
immediate or possible alternatives to their employment either through a better 
employer or towards this through further study, can result in a turn to the 
collective. The perceived or actual closure of this mobility, allows, based on 
other experiences, consideration of the collective, through the union.  
 
Such a road to the collective is a result both of the pressures and needs that 
result from their material conditions and prior organisational and cultural 
experiences that feed, if not neatly, a turn to democratic workplace 
organisation. This supports the idea of Thompson (1963) that the process of 
class formation “owes as much to agency as to conditioning.” More 
particularly, if not as powerfully now as in building the emergent trade unions, 
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workers brought with them experiences from organisations and cultures 
including student, youth and church associations that “predisposed them to a 
democratic union culture,” something I try and show below (Buhlungu, 2009). 
What is apparently so different is the strength of the idea of individualism and 
underlying this - the reinstatement of the omnipotence of capital.  
 
Organisational experiences during school 
Some workers bring to the workplace their student organisational and cultural 
experiences, largely from school but also from post-matric attendance. There 
were similarities between the Giwusa and Samwu cases. In sometimes crude 
ways the experiences express notions of mandate and accountability, of 
different levels of rank and file participation, of debate, meeting procedure, 
and other more administrative and technical practices associated with building 
and maintaining democratic organisation.  
 
Bethwell was not involved in organisation at school but generated experience 
of both debate and helping fellow students. “At school (I was) not involved in 
the organisation (Cosas) but I used to be involved in the debates and in the 
sport… I used to help some other students, just help them, with chalk and the 
board in the classroom and I felt as a teacher, as someone that was 
benefiting them” (Bethwell life story, 5.10.2010).  
 
When the SRC failed to take up the issue of poor teaching he represented the 
problems of his class to the principal, echoing what later happened with 
Samwu in Tshwane. “I was free (to raise issues with the SRC)… There was a 
time when I wanted to raise an illegal strike at school due to the teachers… 
(who) were not teaching us… We called the SRC leaders … They didn’t call a 
meeting, so then I went to the principal. I was brave to face the principal and 
tell him …that … they are not teaching us they are just going around. I came 
… as a representative of students (in my class).” (Bethwell life story, 
5.10.2010).  
 
As a youngster, Mandla experienced the power of collective action at school. 
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“When I came to standard 6 … (there was) a short strike… There were 
complaints about the windows, classroom windows were broken. The doors 
were broken as well. So students were saying they can’t be learning under 
those conditions (and) they brought this matter to the attention of the 
principal… We had a very powerful SRC by that year and that’s when I started 
knowing that there is this leadership at school… They took out all the 
classes… The principal had to address us… Then the (SRC) president spoke 
and said it’s not illegal (the boycott) because it was done inside the school 
and we informed you (the principal) about this … They argued … (and) it was 
concluded to say the doors will be fixed … with the windows, on that day… He 
requested the principal to leave … and he addresses us, from there we 
moved to our respective classes” (Mandla life story, 6.10.2010).  
 
The same worker was later elected to the student body at university, through 
his membership of the Christian society. Here he accumulated further 
organisational skills. 
 
Across both cases others expressed experience of boycotts and action at 
school. This included standing up to an SRC dominated by thugs practiced in 
karate and used to getting their way through fear, ”He was a kung-fu 
guy…You couldn’t talk as you like, you must watch your words really. And that 
day I was fed up… When he was talking very few people would respond 
negative because of the fear… Then I said to them, I am in support of what 
Tsepo is doing but what I hate about Tsepo is his bully kind of style… and 
everyone said, but you have a sort of a point” (Welile life story, 30.10.2010). 
There were also experiences of quietly organising action behind the backs of 
the teachers and the principal, “We once did it (stopped the school)… The 
small (SRC)… was operating underground… We went to the assembly, we 
have already organised… When they say sing… we just keep quite… that 
small SRC… it was planning, but sending the SRC to do…” (Xolani life story, 
5.11.2010). 
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Using the education at work 
The better educated labour broker workers are able to use their ability to read 
notice boards as well as the instruction manuals to outmanoeuvre old style 
managers and supervisors at their own game, whilst the older workers might 
just accept the situation. In this sense, ‘workplace rights’ may be more 
contradictory and not simply an assertion of ‘discipline’ over workers (Kenny, 
2007) providing, under certain circumstances, ways to strengthen workplace 
organisation.  
 
Other organisational and cultural experience 
Some workers spoke of experience deriving from political organisation, 
particularly the ANC Youth League, others of involvement in soccer clubs and 
the church.  Participation in the ANC Youth League taught workers 
organisational understanding and knowledge. A key broker activist in 
Tshwane spoke of seeking and then winning protection against local 
management from a high ranking ANC person. “I went to some of the big 
guns of the ANC and Sanco and said comrades I am living in hell, these 
comrades are doing this. And you know that I have to campaign for ANC 
(laughs). You see I was using those particular tricks just to get sympathy from 
them. One phone call was enough. I’m telling you they just picked up a phone 
and said which department are you… they have called… the guy who was 
heading… (the) department… They said…there is this guy… he is an activist 
of the ANC, leader in the union… they must leave (him) alone” (Welile life 
story, 23.10.2010).   
 
Church 
A fairly strong thread running through all the life histories was involvement in 
particularly the Apostolic churches (defined as part of a broader 
Pentecostolism) and an understanding that even though some of them like the 
ZCC did not encourage political involvement, they were not discouraged to 
partake in trade unionism. This is contradictory and perhaps diverse (there 
are many different churches). It is also not always clear how deep such 
understandings actually influence practice. However several participants 
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expressed their leadership and actions in the union not only as stewardship 
for labour but as a plan endorsed by God. This was a purpose; even a reason 
that explained why there was no funding for studying as the “plan” was for him 
to be in the union (Bethwell life story, 5.10.2010).  
 
As Buhlungu (2008) indicates for the 1980s, churches could be a foundational 
experience brought into unions.  Participants in the research related 
experiences drawn from the church that they suggested imbued and taught 
them compassion, respect and a willingness to listen and serve. It also taught 
them practical skills such as organising events, collecting and recording 
money as well as singing (Welile life story, 23.10.2010, Bethwell life story, 
5.10.2010). 
 
Ergon (2007:451) provides figures to show that in 2001 over 40% of the 
African population belonged to African Initiated churches (AICs) of which the 
“black Zionist” and “Apostolic” churches were the largest. He further 
comments that “the majority of churches (particularly AICs and Evangical-
Pentecostals) eschew “politics” to focus on worship, personal ethics and 
healing” (ibid:459). Anderson (2005:1) however suggests that whilst diverse, 
the theology of Pentecostal churches (of which African initiated church 
membership comprise 75%) provides that members are part of an “egalitarian 
community where social distinctions on the basis of theological elitism 
became blurred, and where (in some cases) the social distinctions were 
further levelled by the use of universal uniforms worn by all the faithful.”  
 
Many participants come from extremely poor backgrounds, growing up in 
large families where not a few went hungry and shoe less during parts of their 
childhood. Often there is an anger expressed against an absent father and an 
expression that they are working for the betterment of their children. They do 
not want the same history of “abandonment” to be inflicted on their children. 
As such there remains the hope that this is still possible. 
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Inequality between workers  
In the situation of the municipality in particular there was a strong sense of 
unfairness/inequality and even antagonism towards permanent workers who 
earn more, “sufficient to employ you as their domestic worker to wash your 
clothes,” with greater benefits. The question is where does this come from? 
There is some evidence that this is fuelled by an understanding that to be a 
worker means to be a permanent worker and as such exclusion (from 
permanancy) means something less (Kenny, 2007). But there are also hints 
for an interpretation based on a wider, more general (liberal?) sense of justice 
and equality, in part grounded in a belief that law should be equally applicable 
to all. One participant continually referred to how labour brokers breached 
principles of the LRA (Samwu parks labour broker shop stewards 17.9.2010), 
another that there is one constitution, implying a set of rights that should be 
equally applicable to all, whilst another refers to the immorality of “selling” jobs 
to those who are already suffering (Samwu waste broker shop stewards 
30.8.2010).  
 
In both cases, workers drew on similar organisational and cultural 
experiences that brought them to the unions and fuelled their activism.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates that in both cases broker workers impact on union 
organisation through their understandings and social meanings that they bring 
to the workplace; and that these may facilitate their organisation. This is 
contradictory. On the one hand the workers see trade unions as belonging to 
an historical past of struggles that no longer exist; caricatured by violent 
strikes that only result in lost wages. On the other there are some who 
understand unions differently. Something gained through family, previous 
work experience or political organisation. Some of these young and better 
educated workers also bring important social analysis and practical 
organisational skills learnt from school, church, cultural and political 
organisation.  
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The social experiences drawn from school and elsewhere are both diluted and 
less politicised than past experiences which contributed to the building of the 
emerging trade unions. Never the less they are an important factor which 
coupled with the particular material circumstances of these broker workers, 
helps to explain their willingness to organise in both cases. However, how this 
potential is brought to fruition depends on how the union interacts and 
connects with these workers; this is crucially shaped by the union’s class 
politics. 
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Chapter 6: Union class politics 
Introduction  
In both cases the workplace is the site for organising (Chapter 4) and broker 
workers have common class and cultural experiences (Chapter 5). However 
despite these similarities there were two broadly different approaches towards 
organising and taking up the demands of labour broker workers.  In the first 
organisation is “driven” and “anchored” (Appolis interview 4.8.2010) by 
Giwusa shop stewards consciously pursuing a programme aimed at both 
permanent and labour broker workers to challenge “concepts” and 
understandings that might divide workers, take up cases and ensure that the 
primary employer is targeted. In the second labour broker workers drive their 
own organisation and formally join Samwu. Samwu engages in slow and often 
legalistic processes without the necessary power to bring about change. 
Driven to change their material conditions at the workplace, provoked by the 
unequal treatment at work and in the union, broker workers organise and act 
impacting on both the union and eventually the municipality.  
 
This chapter seeks to explain these different organising paths through the 
organisational history and politics of the respective union together with an 
understanding of workers’ bargaining power.  
 
THE GIWUSA CASE 
AEL first started using workers supplied through labour brokers in 1992; 
continuing to do so throughout this decade. These workers, employed on 
short-term contracts, were often former AEL retrenchees. This pattern shifted 
in several ways from 2000. Firstly AEL began exclusively using young 
workers who had not less than matric with maths and science. They were 
supplied by Capacity Outsourcing. Secondly these workers no longer worked 
short-term at AEL but were rather “permanently placed” at AEL. Lastly whilst 
the labour supply remained “predominantly” male there was increasing 
feminization resulting in the “majority” of some departments becoming female. 
To meet the sustained demand from AEL, Capacity established an office not 
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far from the Modderfontein factory. By the middle of 2008, Capacity supplied 
500 labour broker workers into a factory totalling about 3 000 workers 
(permanent interview 9.11.2010, Giwusa, 2008:1).  
 
Labour broker workers were doing the same work and enduring the same 
hours as the permanent workers regardless of occupation (as artisans, 
operators or general workers).  However that’s where the similarities end. The 
wage rates of permanent AEL workers are set by the National Bargaining 
Council for the Chemical Industries (NBCCI) and they are paid monthly. 
Broker workers were paid at an hourly rate set by Capacity which amounted 
to a lower rate.8 Furthermore Capacity workers were paid lower shift 
allowances, did not receive a 13th cheque and were not covered for any of the 
benefits. The table below summarises this. 
 
Table 2: Outline of wages and conditions for AEL permanent, temporary and labour 
broker workers   
 
Wages or condition AEL permanent 
worker  
AEL temporary 
worker  
Capacity labour 
broker worker  
Hours of work Similar Similar Similar 
Basic wage & 
conditions 
Set by NBCCI Set by NBCCI Set by Capacity & 
BCEA 
Shift allowance 10 – 12% depending 
on number of shifts 
10 – 12% depending 
on number of shifts 
6 – 10% depending 
on number of shifts 
13th Cheque Yes Yes No 
Annual leave Fixed 20 days  Fixed 20 days BCEA: 1 hour/17 
hours worked, not 
fixed 
Medical aid Yes No No 
Provident fund Yes No No 
Group Life Insurance Yes No No 
Derived from Giwusa 2008:2-5    
 
 
                                                
8 The NBCCI agreements only cover employees in the company bargaining units and have not been 
extended to include those working in the industry such as the Capacity employees.  
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According to Giwusa, AEL had consulted the South African Chemical Workers 
Union (Sacwu) the long established majority union at the Modderfontein plant, 
about its planned use of labour brokers. Sacwu had not objected as it felt this 
would increase employment (Giwusa, 2008, Appolis interview 4.8.2010). The 
historical predecessors of Giwusa (both CWIU and Ceppwawu, see below) 
remained minorities, with CWIU only recognised in 1998 (Giwusa Permanent 
interview 9.11.2010). Responding to the increasing numbers of labour broker 
workers, Giwusa began an engagement with management during 2006. They 
convinced Sacwu to join them in the negotiations behind the demand that 
labour broker workers become permanently employed (Giwusa Permanent 
interview 22.1.2010, Appolis, 25.1.2011). 
 
Giwusa shop stewards began a campaign to recruit and organise labour 
broker workers, approaching them at work, alerted beforehand by 
management of the new entrants into the factory. Broker workers were also 
attracted by notices of union meetings displayed publicly on company notice 
boards. They began to attend, watch and listen to the union general meetings 
resolving in some cases that the issues discussed were their issues too. 
Dismissal and loss of work is a real fear, “I was just taken by… the labour 
broker and he can take me out at any time… Some are even told that if you 
are joining a union you are going to have this problem we are going to take 
you out” (Giwusa broker shop stewards 23.9.2010).  However in part this is 
about knowing your “rights,” and being able to exercise them because “it’s a 
fight anyway against the management” and they will try and find loopholes 
(ibid).  
 
In a bid to attract labour broker workers into the union, Giwusa shop stewards 
consciously opened their workplace general meetings to them, itself made 
possible through existing workplace organisational rights. They made broker 
issues a regular part of the agenda and included them “in decision making” 
(Giwusa 2008: 4).  
 
Union education programmes politicised the shop stewards about 
globalisation and casualization. Shop stewards in turn used this knowledge to 
 66
educate workers about how labour brokers were part of management strategy 
to cheapen, undermine and divide labour. As one shop steward said: “What is 
making division is the flexible approach as far as work is concerned. These 
divisions are basically done by the bosses… so (they) gain.” Permanent and 
labour broker workers are “doing the very same job, using the very same 
machine, breaking together in the same building, working the same shift 
system but we are not equal … I mean there is different conditions…” 
(Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010). In order to deal with such divisions, 
shop stewards emphasise “the commonalities between them, and (that) the 
main problem… (was) exploitation at the hands of AEL” (Giwusa 2008: 2). 
 
Shop stewards thought about how to bring labour broker workers into the 
union, “Whether there is a case from a temp point of view or permanent, we 
need to treat that case (the) same… And that was a campaign from our side 
and then we even go further to invite the same temporaries to elect some 
shop stewards… to have the same forum with them… to attend it together. 
We are going to fight these cases together regardless of this label of temp or 
permanent” (Giwusa Permanent interview 22.1.2010). 
 
In doing this shop stewards had to confront the attitudes of their own 
members who saw the broker workers as threats to their jobs and could be 
condescending and antagonistic to them. 
 
In pursuing this approach towards case handling and in taking up labour 
broker worker issues, employers seemed to tolerate some flexibility in the way 
workers were represented. For example at the onset “surprisingly, 
management of Capacity Outsourcing did not object to AEL shop stewards 
representing workers even though Giwusa had no members amongst 
Capacity” (Giwusa, 2008: 3-4). In addition AEL itself did not object to shop 
stewards acting for broker workers even if legally they fell under another 
“employer.” AEL actually made “the situation conducive… because (of their) 
relationship with Capacity,” including “use (of) venue” and shop steward 
“release… if you are going to have the meeting with Capacity” (Giwusa 
Permanent interview 9.11.2010). 
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Capacity however delayed and frustrated the union’s approach for 
organisational rights over many months. To break this, AEL shop stewards 
again involved themselves directly in meetings with Capacity management, 
raising the organisational rights issues. They also took up immediate worker 
demands such as concerns that resulted from a unilateral shift from weekly to 
monthly pay. The latter was backed by a signed workers petition to garner 
and indicate to management, wider support (Giwusa, 2007 and 2008). In the 
AEL labour relations structures, Giwusa shop stewards tabled Capacity issues 
ensuring that the “Transformation Forum, Negotiating Forum (and) 
Departmental… meetings… were overloaded with problems of Capacity 
workers.” These “exhausted” management who then recognised that the “real 
issue is not so much inequalities but the permanent employment of the 
Capacity Outsourcing Workers” (Giwusa, 2008: 4).  
 
In 2007 the campaign at AEL was taken up through the Giwusa branch which 
organised a campaign against Capacity. This included involving other 
organised sections of the Capacity workforce in particular those at the Star 
workplace in central Johannesburg. Star workers came to a “demonstration 
against Capacity in Modderfontein” together with “workers from other 
factories.” Giwusa shop stewards joined the demonstration after AEL 
management gave them permission (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010). 
 
The union also used “corporate campaign” tactics in an attempt to pressurise 
and embarrass shareholders. For example they focused on Van Zyl Slabbert, 
the Chairperson of Capacity. They framed a rhetoric that suggested 
contradictions between his past involvement in political negotiations leading to 
a post-apartheid South Africa and the current treatment of labour brokers, as 
disrespect for the bill of rights (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010). 
 
Discussions with permanent AEL shop stewards indicate that there was a 
long process of organising underpinned by the fear of dismissal. However the 
initiatives in the workplace (such as the winning of a cases) publicising of 
small victories and the education that highlighted common worker problems, 
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created the basis for recruitment and organising (Giwusa Permanent interview 
9.11.2010, Appolis interview 4.8.2010).  
 
A process of engagement and negotiation with AEL that began formally in 
2006 finally resulted in a settlement in August 2008. AEL would not agree to 
the Giwusa and Sacwu demand for the permanent employment of Capacity 
workers . The company claimed that this would negatively impact on its cost 
structure and as they were in the process of automating the plant “sooner or 
later they will… retrench the people… Their argument as employers (was 
that) they can’t have permanent people today and then tomorrow retrench 
them… (They) then come with the proposal… (that they) can only afford to 
absorb them from Capacity to AEL as temps” (Giwusa Permanent interview 
22.1.2010). The company agreed that effective from the 1st July 2008 a 
Capacity worker who had worked at AEL for 2 years would “automatically 
move over to an AEL temporary employee’s contract” (AEL, 2008). The 2008 
agreement stipulated their employment for a fixed period ending December 
2009 but provided for a possible review of this. Whilst the unions are still 
negotiating finality on this matter, the company has, in the meantime, 
extended the workers’ contracts until the end of 2011(Giwusa Permanent 
interview 22.1.2010). 
 
In becoming temps, AEL recognises the workers service whilst employed in 
AEL by Capacity and if retrenched they will receive severance pay according 
to the BCEA. The first batch of AEL temps employed in September 2008 
increased their monthly wages (by R900 to R1 000) as well as their shift 
allowances to equal the minimums set by the bargaining council. They are 
also covered by the bargaining council in terms of future wage increases. The 
only remaining difference between temp and permanent workers was that 
they are not covered by the provident or medical benefit funds and the group 
life insurance (Giwusa 2008b special pamphlet). This represented a partial 
victory for Giwusa. 
 
By October 2008, 185 Capacity labour broker workers were transformed into 
AEL temps and by mid-2010 this had increased to 340 (see table below). The 
 69
increased use of vulnerable labour by the company and the Giwusa focus has 
led to changes in union membership. Sacwu has the majority of staff 
members; each of the largest three unions, Ceppwawu, Giwusa and Sacwu 
represent a third of the workforce; but amongst AEL temps and labour broker 
employees, Giwusa now attracts the majority. 
 
Table 3: Table: AEL union membership numbers as at 30.6.2010 
 
Union  Staff % Waged % 
AEL 
temp  % 
All 
AEL % 
Ca-
pacity 
Total 
% 
Ceppwawu 9 2 270 35 102 30 381 24  *    
Giwusa 59 13 243 32 183 54 485 31 200 685 32 
Sacwu 221 49 249 33 55 16 525 34  *    
Solidarity 44 10 3 0 0 0 47 3      
UASA 56 12 0 0 0 0 56 4      
SAEWU9 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0      
National 
Mine 
workers 
Union 63 14 0 0 0 0 63 4   
 
  
                       
Total 453 100 765 100 340 100 1558 100 5-600 2258 100 
Derived from AEL, 2010. AEL temps are called contractors in the AEL document; author 
added the Capacity figures for Giwusa and * indicates that Ceppwawu and Sacwu have a 
combined membership of about 2-300. 
 
Union History 
A number of authors highlight the importance of organisational resources and 
union legacy in union revitalisation (Milkman, 2004; Voss and Sherman 2000; 
Lopez, 2004). This is relevant to understanding the sources of organisational 
and political strength that Giwusa was able to draw on. The Giwusa case 
depends on a sustained organisational presence inside the factory that 
includes regular factory meetings, a leadership able to plan strategically and 
shop stewards trained to take up the issues confronting workers including 
through casework and grievances. This draws on a longer organisational and 
political legacy going back to the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU). 
                                                
9 I was unable to find the full name of this union.  
 70
Whilst Giwusa was formed in 1993 as a result of a split from the Chemical, 
Paper, Packaging, Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ceppwawu), its historical 
roots and organisational tradition lie in the CWIU and its politics a radical 
“tendency” within it, “predominantly” rooted on the East Rand (Appolis, 
interview, 25.1.2011). Ceppwawu itself was formed in 1999 through the 
merger of CWIU and the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union 
(Ppwawu). Both Ppwawu and the CWIU had been affiliates of the Federation 
of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu), before the federation joined with 
other unions to launch Cosatu in 1985. Between 1974-9 CWIU had belonged 
to the Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC) (CWIU, 
1984). Giwusa’s tradition therefore lies in a strong background of industrial 
unionism. 
 
CWIU was formed in 1974 in Durban as part of the wave of organisational 
initiatives that followed the 1973 strikes. The CWIU was a militant emerging 
union in a tradition committed to building powerful workplace organisation, 
with elected shop stewards and member accountability together with the 
principle of non-racism. As part of the Fosatu tradition it was cautious in 
linking with community and civic organisations which were seen as “populist” 
and potentially undermining of its accountability to members. The union 
located in what is crudely called the “workerist” camp. It “privileged a class-
based analysis of the struggle and the independence of workers organisations 
from political and community organisations.” This contrasted with the 
“’populists’ who saw the struggle in terms of national liberation and regarded 
the unions as part of a broader anti-apartheid popular front” (Barchiesi and 
Kenny, 2008: 5).  
 
AEL and its workforce (many from the township of Tembisa) are located on 
the East Rand, historically “one of the strongholds of labour radicalism” (Ibid: 
1). According to union officials, coming from the CWIU or perhaps more 
particularly, its evolving radical politics on the Witwatersrand and particularly 
the East Rand, represented a tradition that allowed space and tolerance for 
such radical views. This clashed with the stronger Alliance politics that had 
become dominant inside Ceppwawu, articulated through its national 
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leadership. The resulting clash of traditions as well as differences over the 
projects that the then Witwatersrand Branch of Ceppwawu was beginning to 
experiment with (such as retaining and organising unemployed members) 
resulted in Ceppwawu suspending and then dismissing a number of branch 
officials . Sections of the branch then took the decision to leave Ceppwawu 
and form Giwusa10 (Appolis, 2004; Ceppwawu, 2004). AEL members and 
shop stewards were part of this move and one of its shop stewards became 
the new Giwusa Gauteng branch chairperson. 
 
The majority union in AEL was until relatively recently, the South African 
Chemical Workers Union (Sacwu) one of the then stronger National Council of 
Trade Unions (Nactu) affiliates. Nactu’s politics were dominantly closer to 
those of the PAC and Azapo. In the late 90s Sacwu and CWIU took joint strike 
action for the first time (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010). 2003 saw 
the shift of workers from Ceppwawu to the Giwusa, however more recently 
Ceppwawu has regained a presence in the factory11.  These historical 
legacies representing both overlapping and different union traditions have 
meant that the AEL workforce remains largely divided across unions. It also 
suggests that organisational form is never static but shifts over time.  
 
The organisational legacy that Giwusa draws on assists to understand the 
research that the union initiated into labour brokers and Capacity in particular, 
in order to more effectively develop a strategic plan. This plan included 
targeting both Capacity and AEL as the primary employer. It is after all AEL 
which broadly prescribes how much labour and at what cost, Capacity 
supplies. The legacy also helps to understand the attention paid to building 
the capacity of shop stewards through education and training and how they 
                                                
10 I use the notion of formation because the weight of Giwusa’s members and tradition came from 
Ceppwawu, but in fact Giwusa had existed, as a registered trade union, before the decision to leave 
Ceppwawu was made. 
11 The narrative above is largely devoid of the Ceppwawu presence, this is because until just before mid 
2010 they had very little organisational presence in the plant. However the Sacwu full-time organiser, 
who’d been in the plant since the late 1990s, “fell out with Sacwu.” Although he tried to form another 
union he was unable get it registered. He then “linked up with Ceppwawu who employed him as an 
organiser,” bringing a number of former Sacwu members into the Ceppwawu fold (Appolis, 
25.1.2011).  
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drew on the strength of other workers (the Star Capacity workers in particular) 
to demonstrate at AEL.  
 
However organisational legacies deriving historically from the CWIU were also 
framed and shaped politically. 
 
Union politics 
Giwusa draws on a legacy represented through a layer of shop stewards and 
organisers, of radical and socialist politics independent of and to the left of the 
SACP. This evolved as a tendency located within the old CWIU. This legacy is 
important in understanding their approach to organising. Shop stewards had 
to challenge their own members and convince them of the political importance 
of organising broker workers. They were armed through training and 
education by the union about labour broking in general, with union initiated 
research about Capacity as well as campaigns against labour broking. All of 
this is located in a political understanding that organising labour brokers is not 
just about more members but about rebuilding militant unionism.  
 
Finding ways to connect and link with labour broker workers is sufficiently 
important in the union to warrant policy to create residential locals, considered 
to facilitate greater access for labour brokers into the union; and to 
“structurally set up different processes and create interaction and organisation 
within the union” such as the policy on one workplace shop steward 
committee which joins permanent and labour broker stewards. But as the 
former Giwusa General Secretary explained:  “What we have seen now is that 
the difficulty is there is no initiative… the locals have the same problem as in 
the factories… Permanents are not that keen on even getting labour brokers 
to come to the locals… The difficulty we have is that the base is still 
permanents … and … they are interpreters and executioners of these 
positions and views” (Appolis interview 4.8.2010). 
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Is AEL different to this and if so what is different? Shop stewards did seem to 
understand the political importance as an AEL permanent shop steward 
explains:  
 
“The difference here and the difficulties as trade unions… shop stewards and 
workers, is that the majority of the workforce today are non-permanent 
workers… These people, are not sure of the future, there is a job today but … 
(they) are not sure tomorrow. That is the difficulty when you compare (to) the 
80s” (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010). 
 
There is “today more… flexibility and more… cheap labour that is even 
regulated by the laws… Young workers are young leaders of the unions 
tomorrow and… the strategy of the employers is to frustrate the trade union 
movement so… young workers cannot understand how important the trade 
union movement (is) ” (ibid).     
 
“The militancy of the young workers or the non-permanent workers should be 
used in a way of building the organisation… they are militant12… which is 
hopeful for the trade union, for the trade union movement in general. If we 
focus on that category then we can build a massive force as far as the union 
is concerned…” (ibid).  
 
This political understanding carried by shop stewards corresponded with its 
actual expression in the factory “that the majority of the workforce today is 
non-permanent” (ibid).13 This is not the situation in all workplaces and they 
maybe an “exception” in so far as this is concerned (Appolis 6.12.2010). This 
political understanding was thus able to find some expression in action 
through existing organisation. The fact that the workers do the same work and 
face at least some common problems such as problems over continuous 
shifts, assists the process. It is further assisted in so far as shop stewards 
                                                
12 An example  he based this observation on was their leading role during the 2009 AEL participation 
in the industry wide chemical wage strike; this was further observed in the focus group (Giwusa broker 
shop stewards 9.9.2010) where they expressed anger at the 2010 wage strike being called off and a 
willingness to have joined a union that did partake in strike action at the time. 
13 Meaning the majority excluding staff at AEL. 
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could openly talk to and act for labour broker workers without management 
retribution and in fact would be informed in advance through the selection 
committee “how many people are going to be employed in a particular 
department” (Giwusa Permanent interview 22.1.2010). 
 
Approach to divisions of labour  
Arrighi’s (1990) understanding of borders that workers build between 
themselves when faced with insecurity along with Silver’s (2003) discussion of 
the borders imposed by capital and the state, are consistent with the evidence 
below. However these borders are not immutable and can be challenged and 
exposed politically through struggle.  
 
AEL pursued a cost cutting strategy by cheapening the cost of labour through 
labour broking. This was facilitated by the state legitimising labour brokers as 
employers through the 1995 LRA and allowing/facilitating the possibility for 
them to supply labour at lower cost, with greater legalised flexibility. In this 
context of divisions, imposed by capital and the state, tension arises. Although 
not exclusively, the broker workers in AEL also “differ” from permanent 
workers in so far as they represent a younger generation with formally higher 
educational qualifications. 
 
Speaking of insecurity, one shop steward who is a permanent worker 
commented: “My work as a permanent staff is also at risk because of the 
labour brokers, because they (the employer) can go so far as to retrench the 
permanent staff and then re-employ them as labour brokers. So I can’t be 
sure about my work… I don’t know the next step that AEL is going to do 
because their aim is to save the costs, so I am also one of the costs, so if they 
can cut the costs they will start with me” (Giwusa Permanent interview 
22.1.2010). AEL did use retrenchees during the 90s, but then began only 
using younger and more educated workers.  
 
Another shop steward explains that it’s an “issue of survival … knowing that 
your job can also be terminated at any point if the bosses see that they are 
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not a maximizing the profit (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010). 
Underlying this is the reality initiated by AEL of “massive retrenchments and 
restructuring” that continued throughout the 90s resulting in plant closure and 
a major reduction of the workforce from a national total of over 15 000 to less 
than 5 000 (ibid; Giwusa, 2008). 
 
Naming gives further expression to the division, with some in AEL calling the 
broker workers “’non-residents’14… meaning that they are not permanent… 
There was a culture made by Sacwu … that most of the workers that can talk 
are permanent workers and not … temporary workers… if they talk too much 
the managers will look at them and usually … (they will) not be given 
opportunity” (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010).  
 
Providing further understanding for the division is the notion of a worker as a 
construct from the 1980s that means a full time permanent worker (reinforced 
by law that provides a hierarchy of rights based on the full time permanent) 
(Kenny 2007).  There is some evidence that underlying workers expression of 
the hierarchical division of labour is an understanding that to be a worker is to 
be a fulltime worker and this creates exclusivity (Appolis 6.12.2010). 
 
The key point here is that the Giwusa shop stewards made some strides 
towards blunting or surmounting these divisions through organisational 
practices which actively involved broker workers. It was their political 
understanding of the divisions that led them to stress their commonalities as 
workers confronting the employer.  
 
Workers’ Bargaining Power 
Wright (2000) distinguishes associational power (trade unions and political 
parties) from structural bargaining power (location in the economy). Silver 
(2003) develops this and identifies conditions that increase market bargaining 
power (scarce skills and ability to withdraw from the labour market) and 
                                                
14 I did not explore this but the metaphor seems very similar to historically excluding migrant workers 
under apartheid. 
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workplace bargaining power (based on integrated production). Applying these 
insights provides understanding as to why AEL may have agreed to employ 
the Capacity workers as AEL temps.  AEL is in the business of making 
explosives which together with the materials making them up are highly 
dangerous. It has completed a significant capital investment programme to 
automate the Modderfontein plant and produce an upgraded and “more 
modern version of the product” (Jackson, 2010) and introduce “sophisticated 
machines” (Giwusa Permanent interview 22.1.2010). Management had begun 
to invest in the skilling of the young workers provided through labour brokers. 
“They did employ the maths and science workers… they are trainable, they 
are very much trainable and … can be developed to… artisans… others will 
maybe go to the HR and some … will do the highly job in terms of (product) 
quality” (Ibid). The development of these skills has given these workers 
market bargaining power. “If there is a choice around these issues the 
company will even opt to the degree of letting the permanents go away and 
then remain with this temps because they are young and skilful” (Ibid). The 
shift to fixed term contracts with AEL after a worker had worked for two years 
may reflect the expression of workers market bargaining power, whilst the 
company continues to save some costs and retain flexibility.  
 
The hazardous nature of the product and the associated health and safety 
risks suggest that management would be far more sensitive to the 
consequences of disruption at work. The expression of increasing indications 
of associational power (meetings, demonstrations, representations) through 
the activity of Giwusa may have further tipped management towards direct but 
fixed term contract employment. Lastly the “products are hazardous to 
transport or apply,” and this favours production locations closer to the end-
user (Jackson, 2010). This does not eliminate the possibility of locating 
production elsewhere to avoid increasing worker power or cost, it does 
however reduce the risk of such a “spatial fix.” 
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Law/Legalism 
Literature on union revitalisation in the United States points to the strength in 
winning workplace recognition through organisational power and strength on 
the ground rather than legislation which favours employers (Milkman, 2004; 
Voss and Sherman, 2000). Locally authors have exposed the limits of laws 
such as the LRA which allow employers to avoid providing union recognition 
and consequently organisational rights, and constrict gains and protections 
through bargaining arrangements, minimum protections and strike laws 
(Theron 2009; Grossman, 2009).  
 
A core part of the Giwusa strategy to attract and build the confidence of labour 
broker workers was through using LRA procedural and substantive rights to 
take up grievances and problems, and then to subsequently publicise such 
victories. This framework of industrial relations procedures and rights in the 
factory was itself a consequence of past union and employer struggles.  
 
“If a person is dismissed you are saying we are still challenging the case 
through the union…then give the confidence and hope that this union is doing 
something for you” (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010). When a worker 
“was burnt by acid” and the “doctor… saying (he) can no longer work in the 
chemical environment… I fought that case that is why he is now working in 
the head office of Capacity… as a clerk.” And significantly “he was not a 
member of the union, I made it on the basis that he is a worker and he should 
be assisted” (Giwusa Permanent interview 9.11.2010).  
 
Labour broker shop stewards acknowledged that the union was able to offer 
protection through its knowledge of procedures and substantial rights and 
these encouraged workers to join the union. Following the dismissal of a 
worker for absenteeism workers realised the need to join the union so that if 
this happened to them they would have adequate union protection: “We joined 
the union because… people were getting dismissed. I was having a problem 
of… absenteeism… I knew I will be dismissed for absenteeism, then why 
can’t I be protected before that particular case happens to me?” (Giwusa 
broker shop stewards 9.9.2010) Others felt they could not represent 
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themselves; “You may be dismissed only to find that it wasn’t a case that 
would warrant a dismissal, but because of you not having representation then 
you end up there” (ibid). In another situation broker workers were employed 
on a limited contract to build up stock however Giwusa negotiated for them to 
continue working and as a result they joined the union, “If we don’t have 
union, by the time of retrenchment you should be going out - back straight to 
Capacity, to the labour broker, sit down and have that difficulties … (This) 
cause us to join a union” (ibid). 
 
Whilst the LRA constructs the AEL as the client, rather than the employer of 
the labour broker workers Giwusa found ways to burden management by 
raising broker problems in every forum where it interacted with management.  
 
It is clear that the union attracted members through using the law. Workers 
could see that the union was able and willing to protect them. Layers of AEL 
temps and labour broker workers were later at the forefront of the 2009 wage 
strike and keen to strike again in 2010. This suggests that they constructed 
the union as more than an insurance company that substituted for their 
collective strength. In this sense a tactical use of the law may have facilitated 
the initial space to build the organisational strength and confidence of workers 
on the ground.  
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THE SAMWU CASE 
 
History of using brokers 
The first indication of labour brokers that Samwu knew about in the then 
Pretoria Municipality, was in 1993, in the water department (Rees, 2008b). 
Since then labour broking has considerably expanded. A report presented to 
the Mayor of Tshwane in 2007 identified two types of labour supplied by the 
labour brokers. The first are “office employees such as secretaries, 
administrative officers, IT technicians, switchboard operators and 
programmers.” The second are workers and artisans “mainly used by Public 
Works and Infrastructure Department” (CoT, 2007a cited in Rees 2008b). The 
same report indicated that many workers had been employed for more than 
five years. Infrastructure covers departments dealing with water and 
sanitation, cleaning, parks, transport and electricity. Data on the number and 
spread of broker labours at the end of 2006 is represented in the graph below. 
It shows that many of these basic service delivery departments had large 
numbers of broker workers. They represent 37% of the workforce of these 
departments a total of 3 732 employees (CoT, 2007b cited in Rees, 2008b). 
Note that in housing, city planning and the environment which includes waste 
and parks, broker workers are nearly 50% of total employment. 
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Table 4: Employment Tshwane certain departments November 2006: permanent and 
broker workers 
 
 
Source: Rees, 2008b derived from CoT, 2007b 
 
Samwu branch leaders and broker shop stewards say that whilst the labour 
brokers go under the names of different companies they are in fact the same 
historical company which was broken up into several companies (Rees, 
2008b). The former branch secretary said two of the companies had the same 
UIF reference number. The tender documents indicate continuities with Sam 
Mahlangu who was the project manager for Hobo Gro and Santech between 
1993 and 1996 (both labour brokers), the project manager for ZF in 2002 and 
the current managing Director of Quatrokor. He is also listed as the owner of 
Quatrokor in the most recent (2006) tender documents (Rees, 2008b). The 
table below indicates the names of the different broker companies operating 
between 2002 and 2008. 
  
 
1 975
2 556
973
38
870
6 412
753
2 466
449
0
56
8
3 732
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000 
12 000 
Energy &
electricity
Housing, City
planning & 
environment
Roads &
stormwater
Transport Water &
sanitation Agriculture TOTAL
Department and total
Broker workers
Permanent workers
 81
 
Table 5: Labour brokers from 2002 to 2008 
 
Division or section  2002-4  2004-6  2006-8 
Water and sanitation 
Division 
Quatrokor  Phoenix cc Quatrokor 
Roads and stormwater 
Division 
Zwane construction 
pty Ltd 
Vioflo 2004 Phoenix Omgewings 
Dienste en Arbeids 
Verhurings 
Waste management 
section 
ZF Labour 
contractors 
Quatrokor Milnex 151 
Housing, City Planning 
and Environmental 
Management 
 ZF contractors cc ZF labour contractor cc  
Emergency services   Quatrokor 
Electricity   Umbutho Civil and 
Electrical cc and ACOC 
Electrical cc 
Source: Rees, 2008b derived from Council tender documents 
 
The Samwu study is based primarily on waste management, particularly the 
Pretoria West depot and the smaller ones close to it as these workers were 
central to the wider struggles impacting on labour brokers. Pretoria West had 
close to 1 200 workers. It was used as an assembly point by the employer if 
there was a need for wider report backs, to waste workers. However this is 
also complimented with an understanding of developments in several depots 
linked to the Parks Department. 
 
Wages and conditions 
The wages and conditions of broker workers in Tshwane were considerably 
worse than those of permanent workers. Their poor treatment was a major 
factor in stoking worker anger and combination. 
  
In the early years at the turn of the century, corruption was rife and obtaining 
work often meant bribing the supervisor, who would then deduct his due from 
your pay packet (Welile life story, 30.10.2010; Xolani life story, 5.11.2010). 
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When women began to be employed as street cleaners around 2002/3 they 
were sexually exploited in return for work (Welile life story, 30.10.2010).  
 
There was scant regard for health and safety. Even if you were seriously 
injured a failure to turn up at work could result in you losing your job. A worker 
who narrowly escaped death at the hands of gangsters after a night shift was 
told by his supervisor, return to work the next day or “If you don’t come we will 
replace you and I doubt that you will get another employment” (Welile life 
story, 23.10.2010). In another example a worker explains the process of 
dealing with those who are injured at work, “The manager at work would just 
phone the owner, the labour broker, he doesn’t want to know whether you will 
be there or what’s happening with you. They will take you to the public 
hospital and they will leave you. They will ask you only one question: ‘How 
much do you have in your purse?’ If you only have R5, then they will say it will 
help you to go home… If you say no, they will give you at least R20 or R5 to 
take you to home. They don’t want to know about anything; don’t pay anything 
in hospitals” (Samwu parks broker shop stewards 17.9.2010). 
 
Broker workers worked in their own clothes. Later when the employer 
provided overalls, these shrunk after the first wash whilst the boots were all 
the same size (Samwu waste labour broker shop stewards 30.8.2010)! After 
work workers either washed from a plastic bucket in the street with someone 
holding a blanket around them for privacy, or got onto to the train “smelling 
like a hobo”. The municipality refused the workers access to their premises 
(Samwu waste labour broker shop stewards 30.8.2010).  
 
Wages were low and lowered through supervisor payoffs. “We never knew 
how much per day we (were) earning because… you can work even the 
weekends, but at the end of the month you get… R300 or R400” (ibid).There 
was no regularity in wage payment. They were paid by cheque redeemable at 
“a certain bottle store at Potgieter… But before you can change… you must 
buy maybe 12 whatever you drink…” (ibid).  
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Workers were paid at a daily rate and did not have medical, provident or other 
benefit coverage except for the UIF. If they didn’t work then they were not 
paid. The rates were significantly below those for permanent workers doing 
the same work.  In 2005 they earned R1 188 a month under half of what 
permanents received. This fell to 40% in 2007 when permanents won their 
wage increases. The table below indicates that the average cost savings for 
the municipality was in the region of two thirds of the cost of permanent labour 
during 2006. Workers received even less than this because part of the 
municipal payment goes to the labour broker.  
 
Table 6: Cost to municipality - broker workers and permanent workers 
 
Department Paid to 
labour 
brokers 
(projected) 
No of 
broker 
workers  
Permanent 
workers for 
the same 
money  
Average cost savings 
per worker by using 
broker worker  
Energy & electricity R54.5m 753 436 42% 
Housing, City 
planning & 
environment 
R69.4m 2 466 808 67% 
Roads & stormwater R12.1m 449 157 65% 
Transport 0 0 0  
Water & sanitation R2.9m 56 22 61% 
Source: CoT, 2007b cited in Rees, 2008.  
Note: Paid to labour brokers is a projection to 12 months based on 5 months actual payments 
(July to November 2006). 
 
Municipal broker workers expressed the excitement of earning their first wage 
when they start work. This however soon transforms as they realise that the 
money is insufficient to meet their socially constructed needs and dreams. 
“We started as some happy guys getting somewhere. Not knowing what was 
waiting for us, ahead of us. And then from 2003 to 2005 that’s when we 
started to realise that something was not right there (emphasises), our 
working conditions, everything” (Samwu parks broker shop stewards 
17.9.2010). Workers persistently refer to their conditions and treatment at 
work and how it undermines their sense of dignity and respect.  
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Their common material conditions coupled with their sense of justice and 
dignity made workers ready for organisation and led them to “revolt” (Zebelon 
Monkoe 8.12.2010). These created the platform for worker activists to emerge 
and articulate understandings (of dignity and justice) and for the need to 
explore and find answers to their challenges through organisation. “Due to the 
suffering that they were have, it was easy for them to be convinced” to join the 
union (Xolani life story, 5.11.2010). 
 
Organising 
In the late 90s early 2000, a group of activist broker workers searched for a 
union. This followed an earlier disaster with Satawu whereby workers were 
convinced that the employer had “bought” the organiser. They found a union 
called Peggusa15 and persuaded workers to give it a chance. After the Satawu 
experience “People did not trust anything called union. In fact most of them 
were joining these legal companies to defend their rights and nothing else. 
But what was also discouraging because I also joined one of them, was that 
these legal companies were very clear they will defend you if you are unfairly 
dismissed, unfairly demoted… but they … said they are not going to negotiate 
your salaries, and remember the key issue was the amount of money we were 
earning” (Welile life story, 30.10.2010). 
 
However Peggusa “made a serious inroad,” threatening the company with a 
strike and taking “the company almost to CCMA” but later withdrawing it. “And 
at the end it was only safety… not money.” But “boots (and) overalls was a 
major issue there because people worked with their own clothes behind 
trucks. People clean(ed) street (in) their own clothes. And Peggusa won that 
battle and when people were provided overalls a large number came to 
Peggusa, because it was a kind of victory” (ibid).  
 
                                                
15 Shop stewards were not able to inform me what this acronym stood for. 
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Whilst Peggusa did negotiate a small wage increase there were growing 
questions about what kind of union it was and how it would be able to deliver. 
These seemed to arise specifically because it did not have access to the 
municipality which at the time only recognised Samwu and Imatu. There were 
also indications that the union centred on one person, had “weak” structures 
and was a “fly by night…not affiliated to Cosatu” (Welile life story, 30.10.2010; 
Samwu waste broker shop stewards 30.8.2010). Whilst the issue of access to 
the municipality, as the de facto primary employer is very strategic, less 
visible and unexplored were the political and ideological hints that the union 
was part of the “PAC camp” (Moss Moerane interview, cited in Rees, 2008) 
whilst Samwu leant to Congress. Earlier history elaborated below points to the 
presence of PAC aligned unionists involved in organising the then Pretoria 
municipality. 
 
Both established municipal unions: the Independent Municipal and Allied 
Trade Union (Imatu) but particularly Samwu given its base amongst African 
workers, had up to then not attempted to organise the broker workers. This 
undoubtedly facilitated the initial turn to other trade unions, first Satawu and 
then Peggusa. Although there are slight differences regarding the exact 
timing, around 2001/2002 activists established that Samwu would indeed 
allow labour broker workers into the union and worker activists began handing 
out joining forms to recruit into Samwu.  
 
There was always the fear of losing employment if you organise workers, that 
they “take you to their offices and… dismiss you” (Samwu waste labour broker 
shop stewards 30.8.2010). And it was not possible to openly organise during 
working hours, “because no employer would allow you.  So, when we started 
to be organised, it was something like, can I say underground” (Samwu waste 
labour broker shop stewards 30.8.2010). In recruiting for Samwu, one method 
was for worker activists to meet workers in “groups, not meetings, because 
we were having no place to hold some meetings… we would be chased 
away,” in groups of “1,2,3; 1,2,3” with activists advising them to “act as if you 
know nothing.” The small group of workers who met and planned how to 
organise the depot and waste workers more widely, even at the risk of losing 
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their jobs, were central to galvanising the wider unity of broker workers. Some 
of them knew each other under Peggusa and so there was some connection 
and trust. Others came to know each other through mass meetings of the 
workforce convened by their employer, to explain such matters as why they 
had not received their salary. They spoke to workers whilst they were “having 
some lunch or in the trains, after Shayile (knock-off) when we go to our home, 
in the morning when we come to work. This is where we were trying to do 
everything.” It was only after a Samwu organiser convened the first mass 
meeting of the depot workers to elect shop stewards that workers spoke out 
openly and freely in front of each other (Xolani life story, 5.11.2010).  
 
Part of the fear and hence basis of managerial control at work was racism. 
Workers feared that white managers would “beat you.” The direct and 
courageous action of individuals loosened this grip, in a wider context of 
political change. For example when one worker was short paid by R250, he 
went to the broker’s office, despite being warned against this by other 
workers. Returning he said “I’m back, I’m still alive, nothing has happened to 
me, here is the money. So what is the problem, the problem is you, you are 
just afraid to do something, you just oppressed yourselves” (ibid). Workers 
under Samwu were involved in lower skilled work which was more labour 
intensive than the capital intensive higher skilled labour process at the AEL. 
 
Samwu did not seem to have any special focus or approach to deal with 
labour broker workers beyond responding to issues as they came up. This 
included protecting against unfair dismissal and negotiating recognition 
agreements with the brokers. National union programmes integral to the 
rhythms of the union like wage bargaining and shop steward elections 
focused on permanent Council employees and were not shaped to cover or 
include other categories of workers. The Samwu national wage strike in 2002 
drew sharp attention to the weakness of Samwu’s minority membership in 
Tshwane, a situation partly resulting from the large presence of unorganised 
broker workers (Rees, 2008b). Furthermore, organised broker workers were a 
leading contingent in the actual 2005 wage strike, although they were neither 
covered substantially through the demands or the settlement. They had been 
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given to understand that they would benefit from the 2005 national wage 
round and consequently had to strike again for their own demands (ibid). This 
was a source of growing frustration amongst broker workers. 
 
National Samwu resolutions to grow membership and for provinces to develop 
clear recruitment programmes also focused attention on Samwu’s minority 
status in the Tshwane municipality, one of the few in Gauteng. Whilst 
divisions between permanent and non-permanent workers seemed to be both 
known and growing, the union did not have a systematic political and 
organisational response. Politically the national union held a strong position 
against privatisation, and labour brokers were seen as private companies. Yet 
the abstract position against privatisation was not concretely turned into 
strategy on the ground.  
 
Around 2003/4 the branch began to direct its attention for an end to labour 
brokers in the municipality, through a structure called the Local Labour Forum 
(LLF). Samwu nationally had argued for such a structure in each municipality 
as a place to engage on restructuring and privatisation. The national 
agreement that established them provides for employer and labour 
participation. Instead of negotiating around clear demands and getting into 
dispute, as the Gauteng Provincial Samwu structures had encouraged (part of 
a wider provincial campaign against casualisation and restructuring), very little 
progress was made. The initiative was handed back to the employer who 
administered an innocuous survey on private companies operating in the 
municipality with little consequence. By all accounts there was no clear drive 
from the Samwu branch to use the LLF to focus demands for change nor was 
there any effective link to workers themselves.  
 
As part of the wider Gauteng campaign in (August) 2004, the branch 
organised a march. Marches took place on the same day in other Gauteng 
municipalities. Broker workers along with bus drivers (who faced 
corporatisation) made up the bulk of the march. The memorandum delivered 
to the Tshwane Metropolitan Council, gave the Council fourteen working days 
to respond to the demands (some of which are listed below): 
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· All temporal (sic), casual workers be appointed on permanent basis in 
the coming financial years. 
· All outsourced and privatised service and functions are returned to the 
council in the coming financial year. 
· Tshwane must terminate all existing contracts and embark on a 
process of building internal capacity to provide such services. 
· Develop a sustainable training and capacity programme to ensure 
effective and sustainable delivery  (Samwu, 2004). 
 
The branch never received a clear response from Council and as stated 
before, made little progress in the LLF. Attempts to meet Mayor Mkatshwa 
and deal with the issue “politically” were also unsuccessful. His 
representatives indicated that issues concerning broker workers were the 
terrain of the brokers themselves. The unwillingness to engage occurred in 
the broader context of growing tension and disdain towards Cosatu from the 
ANC under Thabo Mbeki (Mangcu, 2008). This slow progress fuelled further 
suspicion amongst broker workers about union leadership, accentuated by a 
feeling of marginalisation inside the union.  
 
Political changes at the beginning of 2007 with the appointment of a new 
mayor, Gwen Ramakgopa, led to a meeting with Samwu in March 2007 
(Rees, 2008b). “The new mayor was very open. She had an open door policy 
to debate issues with unions… Mayor Father Mkatshwa said he has nothing 
to do with any union in the world… He doesn’t want anything whether you are 
alliance or not” (Samwu waste broker shop stewards 30.8.2010). The 
foundation for such political engagement lay in part with Samwu who as part 
of Cosatu supported the African National Congress and was part of the 
Alliance, but it also lay in the changed attitude of the new Mayor, perhaps 
driven by wider internal political struggles that resulted in Mbeki being 
replaced as ANC president at the end of the year.  
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For the first time and backed by the demands of labour broker workers 
themselves, direct representatives of broker workers were part of the 
discussions. “We ended up taking a decision in 2007… to say … when you go 
to these meetings one of our shop stewards from the very same labour 
brokers must come and observe, even not taking a role, but that observation 
must be there. So that really they can witness what negotiators were doing 
because the trust was lacking completely” (Samwu waste broker shop 
stewards 30.8.2010).  
 
The meeting resulted in a report tabled to the Mayoral Committee in April 
2007 which recommended: 
 
a) Approving a standard labour legislation framework to be included into 
contracts with brokers together with a monitoring mechanism;  
b) That where “temporary workers” are uncovered by a bargaining council 
agreement for their sector that the agreements of the SALGBC be made 
applicable to them;16 
c) Following a review make recommendations that where temporary workers 
are employed for more than a year that they get employment in funded 
positions; 
d) That future requests to source temporary workers are accompanied by a 
cost/benefit analysis comparing them with permanent employees and that 
the municipal manager considers the request before advertising the 
tender. 
 
The Mayoral committee in turn resolved to circulate the report for:  
 
· Further legal and financial comments from Top Management; and  
· “That in the meantime and in order to ensure that the City of Tshwane is 
not contractually committed in respect of engaging labour brokers for the 
three years, contracts for the appointment of the labour brokers be for a 
period not exceeding six months” (CoT, 2007a). 
                                                
16 The term “temporary workers” is the term the report uses to cover broker employees 
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Broker stewards say that they agreed to these and other recommendations 
made in the report (Rees, 2008b). Over a year later in 2008 most departments 
had not made the required financial assessments and the process was 
seemingly halted. 
 
The branch with strong support from the broker stewards organised another 
march on August 8th 2007 to prod forces in Council they assesses as stalling 
the implementation of the report. This was the third march around the same 
issue over a period of four years, although the demands now focused on 
ending labour broking and employing workers “in the Council at Council 
wages and benefits” (Samwu 2007a). Only labour broker workers marched 
accompanied by a few permanent shop stewards.  
 
Broker workers expected a response from Council within ten days. Placards in 
the march clearly demanded an end to labour broking, employment in the 
Council and a “parent’s wage,” a wage suitable for those who have the 
responsibility of supporting children. The later reflected growing displeasure 
about their wages, which stood at R60 a day and which had been increased 
by 6.43% in July, the same percentage provided to municipal workers by the 
SALGBC agreement. Labour brokers refused to bargain with the union to 
increase wages to the SALGBC minimum; instead they had simply 
implemented the 6.43% wage increase, further fuelling workers anger.  
 
Increasing worker anger at Council’s silence led to the three week 
unprotected strike despite the lack of branch leadership support. The strike of 
1 268 Milnex (waste) workers starting on the 3rd September was  spread by 
the workers to other brokers and depots outside of waste. The branch had 
failed to secure protection for the strike or to properly explain any delay or the 
rationale for not doing this, to the severe and bitter criticism of broker workers 
(Rees, 2008b). 
 
The strike was characterised by violence, police arrests, court interdicts and 
the dismissal of hundreds of workers (later reinstated). In one particular 
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incident, a branch office bearer opened a platform at a general meeting of 
strikers to a Councillor who went on to rouse worker anger when he insulted 
and belittled them. Again this and the failure to secure protection for the strike 
were interpreted as the unwillingness of parts of the union to seriously back 
their struggle. The strike resulted in a loose understanding that was never 
implemented to employ some of the broker workers. There were signs for this 
when advertisements for direct employment began to circulate.  
 
We are untouchable at that time, strong and united with our strong 
workforce together (Xolani life story, 5.11.2010).  
 
In May 2008 workers again asserted their power through strike action. This 
gave rise to a memorandum of understanding between Samwu and the 
Council which adopted the principle that the “CoT should do away with labour 
brokers” and implement “direct contracting either permanently or 
contractually.” A task team set up to develop a collective agreement from this 
has still not finalised its work (CoT, 2010).  Through their actions nearly 3 500 
labour broker employees largely involved in waste and gardening services, 
were contracted directly with the council for two years whilst another 
approximately 600 workers were directly employed as permanent workers 
(Derived from CoT, 2010; Tshwane branch communication). Whilst the 
contracts provided higher wages they only equalled the SALGBC minimums 
in the last few months of 2010 but still exclude benefits.  
 
Growing anger from below, coupled with what was considered as second 
class service by parts of the union drove workers and their leaders to 
increasingly mobilise and use their own strength to sort out their problems. 
This ensured greater attention from union leadership and together with other 
factors, real gains from the Council in terms of direct contractual and 
permanent employment. “They saw us acting, fighting… barricading streets, 
starting illegal strike from the blue, stopping illegal strike. You see the plan 
was very simple if we want to strike now we strike now and get back to work 
as if yesterday nothing has happened but we are making a statement that 
even if you are an employer you should not sit in your Rolex and relax and 
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claim that you are managing us… In all sectors: in water and sanitation, in 
parks there were problems… And I knew those problems were very big 
because if waste today stop, tomorrow or next week water and sanitation will 
stop and the other week parks will stop for half a day. And the other week we 
go back to work, just to shake the thoughts of our leaders and the thoughts of 
management” (Welile life story, 23.10.2010). Such struggles have shifted to 
other contingents of workers such as the drivers supplied by Capacity. In the 
eight months prior to June 2010 there were six strikes in waste management 
(CoT, 2010). 
 
Union History 
Understanding union legacy assists me to identify traditions and 
organisational practices that may encourage or act as obstacles to union 
renewal (Lopez, 2004). Samwu was formed in 1987 and combined a number 
of unions or sections of these unions who had formed Cosatu and were bound 
to implement the policy of one union one industry. It brought together unions 
from different organisational and political traditions to form a union of 
municipal workers – in effect given that the employer is government, a one 
employer union. Some of the unions strongly linked to the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) (e.g. Mwusa and Saawu) and strongly opposed registration and 
participation in industrial councils; others, shaped in the Fosatu fold (TGWU) 
together with the CTMWA, emphasised strong shop steward structures and 
workplace organisation whilst others owed their history to the attempts of 
large municipalities to develop sweetheart unionism (like Johannesburg and 
Pretoria) (Mawbey, forthcoming). This mix generated a broadly militant and 
democratic tradition but one that took time to merge in the early years after 
Samwu’s launch. Samwu adopted shop steward structures “borrowing from 
the old General Council of CTMWA, the stress which the FOSATU unions had 
placed on the “shop stewards movement” and Saawu’s even more 
participatory practices” (Ibid:28).  
  
“Of all of the regions it was the Transvaal, and more particularly the 
Witwatersrand Area which faced the problem of integrating unions with 
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divergent organisational traditions and politics. The integration spanned 
Mwusa, TGWU and Saawu” (ibid: 15). It was by far the biggest urban 
conglomeration in South Africa. There were also competing unions who 
belonged to the PAC or Black Consciousness tradition like SABMAWU and 
NUPSW which remained outside Cosatu (Ibid).  
 
The Pretoria Municipal Workers Union (PMWU) attended the Samwu launch 
with observers and by August 1988 was ready to merge with Samwu. 
Historically it was formed by members of a previous liaison committee and 
was recognised by the Pretoria municipality in 1985.  They came with 5 600 
new members and “became for a time the dominant block in the union…This 
structure and its leadership were to play an important role in allowing for the 
region to consolidate. Although at another level the technicalities of merger, 
and at times a lack of transparency about features of its operation were to 
remain a problem for a considerable time” (Ibid: 22). PMWU did not have a 
shop steward structure (John Mawbey 11.1.2011). At the time of merger, 
some of the PMWU leaders decided to join NUPSW, a Nactu affiliate. In April 
1990 workers, whose “core” was hostel based migrants, embarked on a two 
week unprotected wage strike action in Pretoria. The strike was characterised 
by acrimony and tension between Samwu and NUPSW and a considerable 
number of workers joined NUPSW (Mawbey, forthcoming; SALB, 1990). 
  
Going into the 1990s Samwu began to confront significant local government 
restructuring. Samwu “quickly found itself in conflict with the ANC government 
over the issue of privatisation as the ANC, Sanco and many in Cosatu moved 
away from the strong anti-privatisation stance of the early alliance. In the old 
days privatisation was condemned as unilateral restructuring.  Suddenly it 
was encouraged because the liberation forces were in power and would 
regulate its effects” (Mawbey, 2007). However whilst this account 
characterises Samwu as standing to the left in the struggle against 
privatisation this was unevenly reflected inside Samwu as a more recent 
workshop (not official policy)  suggests, “The greatest cause of division within 
the workers at this time was linked to party political factionalism within the 
alliance” (Samwu, 2010: 7). 
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How do we explain the Samwu response? 
The power that broker workers built on the ground was largely driven by 
workers themselves as well as carefully planned by their workplace leaders. It 
took many after hour meetings, plans and processes ensuring regular 
feedback through general meetings. But it may not have happened outside 
the framework of the union, despite the limits of this support. The union 
offered a form of protection, against dismissal and against the arbitrariness of 
management, within which workers could build their strength, and even if 
unmandated and not from the official leadership, some support to assist their 
struggle. Ironically their treatment at work and in the union sharpened their 
resolve and unity to fight. 
 
Despite the organisational histories and constitutional adaptation of shop 
steward structures, Samwu’s base and leadership were not organically 
connecting with broker workers. The drive to organise came from broker 
workers themselves with very little support from this base. Samwu as a union 
was not challenging members based on its organisational presence in the 
workplace; in fact there are indications that the branch did not have proper or 
full knowledge regarding the presence and geographical spread of broker 
workers until broker workers themselves came to the Samwu offices.  
 
This raises several issues which in turn require explanation. Whilst Samwu 
Tshwane might have an organisational presence in the workplace, the 
experience of the workplace and the changes inflicting it are not being 
assessed and shared inside the union; this certainly suggests either a 
weakening or already weak workplace organisation. But why? 
 
The previous Tshwane branch secretary acknowledged that the union had not 
made the time to go to general meetings and assist in shaping an agenda that 
united workers and that there had been a lack of education and training work 
amongst migrant workers in the hostels (Rees, 2008b). The current Samwu 
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Tshwane branch secretary explains that it is also about limited political 
capacity:  
 
“Firstly it was conscientising the workers around that. It sort of… required 
quite a lot of education and quite a lot of time somewhere in workshops and 
everything, particularly during the general meetings. But I mean the 
leadership from the branch level could not go around and do the very same 
work… we didn’t have a bigger pool in order to address those things. The 
level of conscience around the workers struggle (is) also… limited… within 
our own members… (and) at the leadership level. So that’s the reason why 
we did have a problem to challenge that once and for all. Particularly with 
regard to conscientising the workers” (Zebelon Monkoe 8.12.2010). 
 
Continuing he said that even though the branch adopted programmes in line 
with Samwu national resolutions, these were not implemented as 
“unconsciously” time and activity is directed elsewhere: 
 
“It’s where we spend our time… we are prioritising other things over the rest 
of the problems… We are doing fire fighting from time to time, spending our 
time doing disciplinary cases rather than doing organising” (ibid). 
 
Thus he acknowledges that organising itself has become less of a priority and 
whilst there is a capacity problem, building capacity alone will not solve this 
without at the same time reprioritising organising, and I would add rebuilding 
organisation on the ground. But why? This is not to suggest there is not a 
challenge of capacity in the union. As former general secretary, Roger Ronnie 
suggests, organising broker workers maybe a long, patient and dedicated task 
without quick gains and there is a problem in “forgetting how to go out and 
recruit workers from scratch – ‘at the workplace gate’” (Roger Ronnie 
8.12.2010; Samwu, 2010:7).  And whilst this gives theoretical support for parts 
of both Milkman’s (2004) and Voss and Sherman’s (2000) work which suggest 
the importance of resources from the top there is a need for further 
explanation.  
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Union politics 
Why is there a failure to prioritise the immediate challenges of organising and 
building strong workplace organisation as well as building the strongest 
support to win workers’ demands? Part of an explanation lies in the decline of 
worker control historically rooted in the workplace (although this may have 
been historically weak under Samwu Pretoria), coupled with the rise of 
bureaucracy (Buhlungu, 2010). Samwu succeeded in winning national central 
bargaining, through a bargaining council from 1998. Increasingly the rhythms 
of the union whether through bargaining or shop steward elections have been 
driven centrally, reinforcing a decline in local activity and agenda setting 
based on the workplace. In this explanation agendas derive nationally.  
Reduced worker control locally facilitates the growth of bureaucracy able to 
pursue its own interests. Such labour relations architecture (including the 
CCMA) effects demobilisation, turning attention away from organising on the 
ground strength towards legal solutions and agreements acceptable to capital 
(Grossman, 2009) or as discussed below acceptable to the ANC. This reflects 
in union structures where the best resources (human and technical) locate at 
head office rather than locally actually suggesting further nuance regarding 
how the top connects the bottom (Milkman, 2004). Samwu is fire fighting and 
organisers locally are tied up in dealing with CCMA cases with no time to do 
other work.  
 
Further expression of this is found in the weak and moderate, ineffectual 
engagement of Samwu Tshwane around labour brokers through the LLF 
where employer interests dominated and very little was achieved. This took 
place without the active backing and mobilising of workers on the ground. 
What could have been the focus of a campaign was a slow and ultimately 
fruitless engagement in committees. It is the pressure from the ground that 
ultimately forces a different and far more militant approach from the union’s 
branch leadership. Pressure from the ground is reinforced by suspicion of 
corruption as well as the knowledge of a successful waste worker struggle in 
Tembisa that won a large wage increase.17 Greater militancy from the ground 
                                                
17 This is evidence of the strength in workers learning from each other: waste workers in Tembisa 
struke and fought hard, winning if I recall a R2500 wage, far above the Tshwane broker workers at the 
 97
amongst broker workers has a wider resonance inside Samwu given its 
militant history and despite the tendencies indicated above.  
 
There is deep suspicion and belief that the slow progress on the labour broker 
issue by the Samwu branch was due to corruption amongst the union 
leadership developing relationships with the labour brokers which 
“compromise the workers” (Zebelon Monkoe, 8.12.2010). This possibility is 
not unprecedented, several branch office bearers had been found guilty in the 
union of corruption related to Gems, a micro lender, in a much wider expose’ 
involving Samwu branch and provincial office bearers across key regions in 
the union.  
 
Secondly, despite the memorandum of understanding with the Council to 
phase out labour brokers, Council did not implement this. It was suggested 
that there was real fear in the municipality about dealing with the issue due to 
the alleged connection between labour broker companies, Councillors and the 
ANC region. “They were saying as a City they are enough, they do not want 
labour brokers anymore. They want to do away with labour brokers. We came 
out in agreement all of us. But… outside you find the very same person (has) 
represent(ed) the council… to extend one of the (labour broker) 
contracts…These contracts are… the fronts of some of the councillors… The 
very same owners were owning the same (labour broker) companies 
throughout, for a long period and then they were the only people winning 
those tenders so it shows that it was a cartel of some kind… The other 
reason, the first report that went to council… nobody want to touch this issue 
in the Council, everybody is afraid because they might be killed, because 
there are threats and those other things, so no-one is so brave to deal with 
the very same thing as the contracts” (Communication Tshwane branch).  
“Remember these companies were friends, actually they were one company, 
broers, broerskap and so on. So you couldn’t win any tender of major 
                                                                                                                                       
time. Workers either learnt of this because they live in Tembisa or through the fact that during this 
strike the restructuring committee a sub-committee in the Gauteng Samwu province held its meeting in 
Tembisa, at the time of the strike (as a way of sharing that experience) calling on branches to have at 
least one labour broker or subcontractor worker as a delegate to the restructuring meeting (i.e. a form of 
direct representation from those affected). 
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employees with this high income that may accumulate, except if you have this 
connection with this REC people” (Welile life story, 23.10.2010).  
 
However beyond corruption, there is a clear tension in building a militant 
struggle based on the demands of workers against an employer who is at the 
same time framed as a political ally. This tension is further accentuated to the 
extent that branch or other worker leaders see their future prospects either in 
government or politically. 
 
Approach to divisions of labour  
There was a hatred, there was two Samwu’s, for contract and for 
Council. They even didn’t want to see us (Xolani life story, 5.11.2010).  
 
If there is a recurrent theme it is the division between broker and permanent 
workers and its echo inside Samwu. This is not to say that all depots and 
workplaces reflected this to the same degree, it is to say that there were 
widespread signs of such difference. It is reflected in the workplace and inside 
Samwu where broker workers and their leaders were not incorporated and 
adequately involved in the Samwu structures. Instead broker shop stewards 
met separately as a “contract” committee. It was only at the end of 2006 that 
they first attended a Samwu structure. A shop steward explains, “One had to 
plan how to address permanent employees. Then after the intro to Samwu we 
thought we had the platform to break the impasse. Ha! It was even worse 
unfortunately, it was even worse. We went to Samwu, we were sitting outside. 
All the constitutional structures we were not sitting there. We were not allowed 
to sit there. So, how to influence the planning? How to ask for help when 
you’re mobilising because permanent employees will hold their meetings with 
their structures, all their structures? Contract employees will hold their 
meetings maybe on Saturday and maybe after hours, only. I remember I was 
chased away on one of the structural meetings of Samwu by a shop steward 
who was permanent. He … was a chairperson, he said, ‘in the agenda items 
that I have I don’t have an item of contracts, so can you excuse us’. (Speaking 
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painfully) And I was sent by masses to say: ‘Go and tell those people that we 
need their support’” (Welile life story, 23.10.2010).  
 
Worker leaders also felt that the Samwu branch office discriminated against 
them in terms of allocation of resources to organise and take care of the 
problems that workers faced. “Permanent shop steward didn’t want us to meet 
with them in their formal structures… there was what they called the so-called 
‘contract meeting’… Not typing our minutes… (These were) write(n) in pen 
and the paper… We are not being taken seriously… Definitely they used to 
come and speak to us… and update us. But they had no interest in sitting with 
us just to hear our background or how do we cope or what are the masses 
saying down there. No, no, no, it was a bit far away. But they were 
negotiating ” (Samwu waste broker shop stewards 30.8.2010, my emphasis).  
  
Explaining the attitude of municipal permanent workers, Samwu Tshwane 
branch secretary, Zebelon Monkoe said that broker workers “can be utilised 
for any job and for anything and at any will of the employer.” During strikes 
“because these people remain unorganised it’s not easy for them to join … 
and then most of the time employer utilise them as scab…They are regarded 
as good people because in most instances they will do the work maybe faster 
than the permanent workers. So at some point it created an attitude towards 
the contract workers.” The steep rise in the use of broker workers in the 
Tshwane municipality was partially driven by the threat to withdraw national 
grants if fixed limits for expenditure on staff, set by national treasury, were 
exceeded. Following a period of (relative) labour stability in Tshwane there 
were two national wage strikes that Samwu Tshwane Branch participated in 
during 2002 and 2005, periods that also coincided with the rapid increase of 
broker labour.  
 
As such permanents called broker workers “sell outs” and “some of them… 
even coin certain phrases to say ‘these people are the rramonale, the child of 
a smaller father.’” They are seen as “junior” and “not regarded as workers” 
(Zebelon Monkoe 8.12.2010).  
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Kenny (2007) provides some understanding of the division as rooted in the 
notion of a worker, meaning a full time permanent worker, a construct from 
the 1980s, reinforced by law that provides a hierarchy of rights based on the 
full time permanent. There is some confirmation of this in that Samwu 
members understand a worker as a permanent worker, “I’m a permanent 
worker, that on its own also defines understanding amongst our own 
members of what a worker relates to… Those people were… regarded as 
people that just assist. These are the people that are just passing by - are not 
necessarily here to do the work… They don’t belong here, so they are not 
necessarily the workers” (Zebelon Monkoe 8.12.2010). However, unlike the 
Giwusa case above, these attitudes towards broker workers were not 
organisationally or politically challenged. 
 
Bargaining Power 
Silver (2003) assists to understand what bargaining power labour broker 
workers brought and how this built their struggle. Unlike in the case of 
Capacity workers, labour broker workers in the Samwu case (waste and 
parks) have limited market bargaining power given that workers are largely 
unskilled or in the case of drivers, semi-skilled; they also have very limited 
options to withdraw from the labour market.  Furthermore they have weak 
workplace bargaining power given the fragmentation of work. Stoppages by 
small groups of workers (a driver, or a waste crew) do not impact on large 
groups of other workers (other drivers, other waste crews, etc) given the lack 
of integration of the work process. Devoid of structural power, workers had to 
build their associational power (Wright, 2000). This meant organising so that 
when they took action a significant number of workers came out at the same 
time. Facilitating this organisation in waste was the Pretoria West Waste 
depot located in the inner city with a concentration of over a thousand 
workers.  
 
Cleaning a big City used by large numbers of people is continuous, including 
during the night. Whilst a short strike may not have the same strategic impact 
as say an electricity strike, if no work is done, the consequences are 
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immediate and in the public eye, in the form of uncollected dirt and rubbish. 
Longer strikes, provided there is some accumulation of dirt (i.e. that scabs are 
unsuccessful), will impact on the image and operation of inner City 
companies. These companies are unable to simply move to another place 
given their large fixed capital investment (thus limiting a spatial fix). This 
constraint on capital mobility strengthens the impact of waste worker’s 
associational bargaining power. This understanding draws on Silver’s (2003) 
analysis of the power underlying the Justice for Janitor campaign.   
 
This short analysis also suggests that waste workers as such are more 
strategic than say parks workers. 
 
Law/Legalism 
Although sketchy the evidence suggests that defending worker rights at the 
workplace played some role in attracting workers to unions although it was not 
systematically and consciously pursued by Samwu. The initial wave of joining 
does not however seem to have depended on having won members through 
winning cases, although later gains raised and attracted membership and 
joining Samwu did result in a decrease in the exercise of arbitrary managerial 
power. 
 
Earlier it was suggested that the industrial relations architecture strengthens 
solutions away from workers strength on the ground. In the Samwu case this 
is expressed through the legalism associated with developing a constitutional 
change to the scope of the bargaining council (the SALGBC) to ensure 
coverage for the new legal entities (utilities, agencies and corporations) 
introduced by the Johannesburg iGoli 2002 plan in 2000. Such a change 
would have resulted in coverage for workers under labour brokers. This has 
been subject to an arbitration dispute since 2004 and due to changes since 
then was about to be withdrawn by Samwu in 2010. The real point is that the 
process found no expression or link through organisation and struggle to the 
ground. This is similarly echoed in the Cosatu campaign to ban labour brokers 
which focuses on legal changes dependant on political support exclusively, 
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with no apparent link to involving and organising those affected on the ground, 
despite the clear opportunity for this. This draws attention to not relying on the 
law and parliament alone and to the importance of building rank and file 
involvement and support (Milkman, 2004; Voss and Sherman, 2000; Tait, 
2005). 
 
Summary and comparison of cases  
In both the Giwusa and Samwu cases labour broker workers are initially 
excited to earn a wage when they first start work. This soon transforms into 
the realisation that it is insufficient to meet their socially constructed needs 
and dreams. This is common between the cases and becomes a basis for 
organisation. It is further fuelled particularly in the municipality by the 
conditions, treatment and inequality at work which undermine dignity and 
respect. This treatment is a major reason leading to “revolt” (Zebelon Monkoe 
8.12.2010). 
 
The historical membership of both unions is cautious and condescending 
towards labour broker workers, treating them as a threat and not seeing them 
as workers (who are understood to be permanent). Facilitated by their spatial 
concentration in the factory and their common work and conditions (e.g. 
hours) Giwusa shop stewards pursue a set of strategies, including focus on 
the primary employer, to challenge this and construct unity. In this they draw 
both on an organisational legacy that focuses on strong workplace 
organisation and on new resource back-up (education, training, research). 
Crucially this is framed and supported by the union as a political priority as it 
conceives of labour broker workers and such layers as a force to revive 
militant unionism. The employment by AEL of the young broker workers on 
fixed term contracts is further facilitated by their market bargaining power 
(skills) and the strategic nature of the production of explosives.  
    
Largely through the organisational efforts and historical experiences of the 
labour broker workers, workers themselves build organisation from below and 
turn to Samwu. Samwu is unable to challenge and build workplace unity 
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between labour broker and permanent workers due to scarce resources, 
capacity and possible historical organisational weakness in the workplace. 
Disunity is strengthened where permanents supervise labour broker workers 
and where the municipality maintains a physical separation between the 
workforces. Politically unity in the workplace has not been prioritised despite 
sometimes violent clashes between workers. This is explained partly as a 
result of an industrial relations architecture which is centralised and dominates 
the rhythms of the union through such issues as wage bargaining and shop 
steward elections and has not been tempered to accommodate either broker 
workers or specific workplace needs. This architecture supports bureaucratic 
approaches to negotiations in local forums and at a “political level” 
disconnected to worker mobilisation on the ground. Engagement with the 
employer is further complicated because the ANC is not only the employer 
that escalated the use of labour brokering, but also a political ally. This 
weakens struggle based on worker mandates. These conditions are however 
challenged and undermined through the self-organisation of labour broker 
workers. Despite their marginalisation they use the space in the union and 
force it to provide resources to back mass action which they have determined. 
Through their exercise of associational power they also force the municipality 
to concede to forms of direct employment.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In examining the Giwusa and Samwu cases of organising labour broker 
workers, organisational form was not a necessary condition for success.  This 
suggested that the emphasis that Milkman (2004) and others place on this or 
at least its generalisation is both misplaced and may in fact conceal 
understanding. I found that other factors including organisation legacies in the 
workplace, dealing with relations between labour broker and permanent 
workers, relatively “permanent” deployment at the workplace; the majority 
character of the labour broker workforce in relation to a shrinking permanent 
workforce, as well as the political priorities of the union, played a more 
important role.  
 
Understanding what labour broker workers themselves bring to organisation 
particularly through the work of Thompson (1963) tempers an institutional 
understanding of unions and re-asserts workers as social actors both shaped 
by and making their own history.  
 
I found that there was a willingness of broker workers to organise in response 
to what they experience as low wages, conditions and particularly in the 
Samwu case, the way they were treated. However to realise this requires 
challenging presumptions they carry against the need for a union, as well as 
overcoming the fear of dismissal (particularly in the Samwu case). Amongst 
workers themselves there are those that have a different understanding of 
unions gained through family, previous work experience or political 
organisation. Some of them, young and better educated, bring important 
social experiences drawn from school, church, cultural and political 
organisation which equips them with some technical and organisational skills 
and understandings they are able to utilise inside the union.  
 
The experience of Samwu shows that broker workers were able to draw on 
these resources to build their strength, despite limited union support. Crucially 
however, how this potential is brought to fruition depends on how the union 
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interacts and connects with these workers. This is shaped by the class politics 
of the union. 
 
The historical membership of both unions did not organise the labour broker 
workers, are often antagonistic to them and see them as a threat. It is useful 
to understand these divisions through Kenny (2007) as rooted in a legacy of 
what it means to be a worker: permanent and linked to a set of workplace 
rights. This then helps to explain why unions do not implement institutional 
strategies towards organising. However more than this, the Giwusa and 
Samwu cases suggest that union politics are also an important explanation, 
both as constructed historically and as rooted in the contradictions of unions 
under capitalism (Grossman, 2009).  
 
Facilitated by commonalities of space and work Giwusa shop stewards lead a 
drive to organise broker workers through strategies aiming to build worker 
unity. They draw on an organisational legacy of strong workplace 
organisation. Crucially however this is framed and supported by the union and 
its leadership as a political priority with the understanding that labour broker 
workers are a force to revive militant unionism. The employment by AEL of 
the young broker workers on fixed term contracts is further supported 
because they have market bargaining power (skills) in the strategic industry of 
explosive production.  
    
Municipal labour broker workers are the force driving their organisation from 
below which eventually leads them to Samwu. Samwu is unable to challenge 
and build workplace unity between labour broker and permanent workers due 
to scarce resources, capacity and possible historical organisational weakness 
in the workplace. Disunity is strengthened where permanents supervise 
labour broker workers and where the municipality maintains a physical 
separation between the workforces. Politically unity in the workplace has not 
been prioritised despite sometimes violent clashes between workers. This is 
explained partly as a result of the industrial relations architecture which is 
centralised and dominates the rhythms of the union and displaces workplace 
agendas. Bureaucratic approaches to negotiations in local forums and at a 
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“political level” are disconnected to worker mobilisation on the ground whether 
through corruption or ambivalence in relation to the employer (the ANC) who 
is also a political ally.  
 
These conditions are however challenged and undermined through the 
persistent self organisation of labour broker workers who despite initial 
marginalisation in the union, use union space to win greater attention and 
support from Branch leadership. Through their exercise of associational 
power they force the municipality to also concede to their direct employment.  
 
Approaches which only focus on organisational form or worker agency as the 
key variable overlook the fundamental centrality of union politics to our 
understanding of how unions organise flexible workers.  We are required to 
make a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between top and bottom.  
Milkman points out that both are required, but we also need a more grounded 
analysis of the dialectics between these factors.   
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